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I. Introduction 
Why does the study of public sector labor markets in the United States 
warrant a separate chapter in this Handbook of Labor Economics? One reason 
is that federal, state, and local governments are differentiated from most 
(but not all) private-sector employers in that profit maximization is 
unlikely to be an objective of governmental units. As such, labor-market 
models based upon the assumption of profit maximization are clearly inap-
propriate for the government sector; alternative models must be developed. 
A second is that employment expanded more rapidly between 1950 and 1975 
in the state and local government (SLG) sector than in any other sector of 
the economy. While civilian employment by the federal government (when 
expressed as a percentage of total nonagricultural employment) actually 
declined slightly during the period, SLG employment rose from 9.1 percent 
to 15.5 percent of total nonagricultural payroll employment. Indeed, the 
absolute number of state- and local-government employees almost tripled 
during this period, rising from 4.1 to 11.9 million. Although the share 
of SLG employment in total employment has declined slightly since 1975, 
the absolute number of SLG employees has continued to rise, reaching over 
13 million in 1982. The growing importance of the sector suggests that 
attention should be directed to analyses of it. 
A third is that the pattern of unionization and the laws governing 
collective bargaining, dispute resolution, and wage determination differ 
between the public and private sectors. In contrast to the declining 
fraction of private sector workers who are union members, union membership 
is growing rapidly in the public sector in both absolute and percentage 
terms. For example, between 1964 and 1978, the proportion of federal 
2 
employees who belonged to unions increased from 38.2 percent to 50.2 percent. 
Similarly, the proportion of SLG employees belonging to unions rose from 
7.7 percent to 17.4 percent during the same period. If one includes member-
ship in bargaining organizations—which include professional organizations 
such as the National Education Association (NEA) that over time have 
behaved more and more like unions—an even more rapid increse is observed, 
with the percentage of SLG employees rising to 36.2 percent in 1978. 
One factor that affected this growth in public-sector unionization 
was changing public attitudes and legislation governing bargaining in the 
public sector. Unlike the private sector where the rights of workers to 
organize and bargain collectively have been guaranteed since the National 
Labor Relations Act, laws governing bargaining in the public sector are of 
much more recent vintage. Executive Order 10988 issued by President John 
F. Kennedy in 1962 legitimized collective bargaining in the federal sector 
for the first time, providing federal workers with the rights to join 
unions and bargain over working conditions—but not wages. While this 
executive order has been modified several times since then, most federal 
employees' wages are still not determined by the collective bargaining 
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process. Instead they are determined via comparability legislation, 
first passed in 1962, which ties the wages of most federal civilian 
workers to the results of government surveys of wages of "comparable" 
private workers, subject to possible Presidential or Congressional modifi-
4 
cation. The influence of federal unions on wages operates, then primarily 
through the political pressure they can exert on the President and Congress 
to approve wage increases that the surveys suggest afce warranted. 
3 
Favorable state legislation for SLG employee collective bargaining 
began with a 1959 law in Wisconsin; prior to that date collective bargain-
ing was effectively prohibited in the state and local sector. By the late 
1970s most industrial states had adopted statutes that permitted SLG 
employees to participate in the determination of their wages and conditions 
of employment, although not all employees in each state were covered by the 
5 
laws. While these statutes were being adopted, and at the same time that 
employment and unionization were growing in the SLG sector, SLG employees' 
earnings also started to rise relative to the earnings of private sector 
employees. From the mid-1950s to 1970, SLG employees' average earnings 
improved relative to those of private employees by some 15 to 20 percent. 
(However, during the 1970s the trend was reversed, and SLG employees' earn-
ings fell relative to those of their private sector counterparts.) 
The growth in the relative earnings position of SLG employees during 
the 1960s, coupled with the growing strength of public-employee unions, 
their increased militancy, and the trend towards allowing SLG employees to 
bargain over wage issues, led to fears that inflationary wage settlements 
would continue in the sector and aggravate the financial problems faced by 
state and local governments. These fears were explicitly based upon the 
belief that many public services are essential and this implied that 
the wage elasticity of demand for public employees was very inelastic. To 
many, the logical conclusion was that, in the absence of market constraints 
that would limit the wage demands of public employees, limitations should 
be placed on the collective bargaining rights of these groups. 
4 
Although by 1981 eight states did grant the right to strike 
in one form or another to selected employee groups, most continued historic 
prohibitions against strikes. The states that prohibited strikes, however, 
often provided assistance to local governments and unions in settling 
contract disputes, with a number of states adopting forms of binding arbi-
tration as the terminal stage in their impasse procedures. How these 
alternative institutional arrangements operate and affect economic out-
comes is, of course, worthy of discussion. 
A final reason why public-sector labor markets warrant separate treat-
ment is that they represent an area toward which much of our public policy 
has recently been directed. To take one example, during the decade of the 
'70s attempts were made to reduce unemployment by means of public service 
employment (PSE) programs. Starting with the Emergency Employment Act of 
1971 and then continuing under the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (CETA), the federal government provided funds to state and local govern-
ments to increase their employment levels, in the hope that the availability 
of extra public sector jobs would provide job opportunities for the 
unemployed. By 1978, 569,000 individuals were reported employed on PSE 
program funds; these employees comprised some 3.3 percent of total SLG 
8 
employment. To take another example, growing concern over the fiscal 
condition of state and local governments and the increased state and local 
tax burden borne by taxpayers led to the passage of expenditure- and tax-
limitation legislation in a number of states in the late 1970s. The most 
notable was the enactment of Proposition 13 in California, which drastically 
5 
reduced local property taxes and limited the ability of all governmental 
units in the state to increase their revenues. 
The unique nature of the agents in public sector labor markets (non-
profit organizations), of the institutional arrangements governing these 
markets, and of the public policies that have been directed towards them, 
suggest then that research relating to them warrants separate treatment 
in this volume. The discussion that follows is structured along topical 
lines. We begin with a discussion of the research on wage determination 
in the state and local government (SLG) sector. Although our focus is on 
attempts to estimate union/nonunion wage and total compensation differen-
tials, we also emphasize the importance of various characteristics of the 
environment in which bargaining takes place. This discussion is followed 
by brief discussions of the research on the effects of unions on produc-
tivity and on the estimation of compensating wage differentials for various 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary job characteristics in the sector. 
The literature on wage determination in the SLG sector is based, at 
least implicitly, on some notion of the forces that affect the demand for 
labor in the public sector. In Section V, we explicitly focus on 
studies of public sector labor demand that have sought to provide estimates 
both of wage elasticities of demand for various categories of SLG 
employees and of the net job creation effects of PSE programs. The 
former studies are important because they shed light on the question of 
whether the market forces that constrain union power in the private sector 
would exist in the public sector if the same institutional rules governed 
6 
collective bargaining in both sectors. The latter are important because 
they address the issue of "fiscal substitution"; to what extent were PSE 
funds used to hire SLG employees who would have been hired (in the aggregate) 
even in the absence of the program? 
The long section that follows analyzes the research relating to dispute 
resolution in the SLG sector. It first discusses normative models of dif-
ferent impasse procedures (conventional arbitration, final-offer arbitration, 
the right to strike) and then the empirical research on the determinants 
of the use of the various procedures. Finally, it discusses studies of the 
effects of the availability, and the use, of the various procedures on wage 
and nonwage outcomes. 
Given the variety of institutional arrangements that determine compen-
sation in the public sector, it is natural to ask whether they generate 
settlements that leave "comparably qualified" workers performing "comparable" 
work in the public and private sectors receiving roughly equal total compen-
sation. Answers to such a question are of more than academic interest; 
especially in the federal sector where wages for a majority of the civilian 
workers are established via "comparability" surveys. The next section 
evaluates the research on this question. It is followed by a discussion of 
the research on gender and race discrimination in public sector labor markets 
and then some brief concluding remarks. 
Both space and time constraints have caused us to limit the scope of 
our survey and three omissions warrant special mention. First, except in 
passing, we have limited our discussion to public sector labor markets in 
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the United States and ignored studies of other countries. Second, our 
discussion is limited to nonmilitary employees; we have ignored the 
7 
important literature on military manpower and compensation problems. 
Third, in the main, we have not discussed the research relating to the 
compensation of top government officials, especially those in the federal 
11 
sector. 
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II. Wage Determination in the State and Local Government Sector 
Several features distinguish studies of the effects of collective 
bargaining on SLG employees' wages from similar studies of union wage 
effects in the private sector. First, the unit of observation in the 
public sector studies is typically an individual bargaining unit where, 
in the presence of collective bargaining, the same negotiated union wage 
scale covers nonunion employees as well as union employees. In contrast 
the private sector studies tend to use either individual workers or 
industry aggregates as the units of observation. In the latter case, 
data on workers covered by union contracts are merged with data on 
workers not covered by union contracts and the observed average industry 
wage is typically not the result of any single negotiation. 
Second, in an attempt to control for the forces other than collective 
bargaining that might influence wages, public sector studies tend to stress 
economic, demographic, and political variables relating to the geographic 
area that the bargaining unit is in, while typically ignoring the personal 
characteristics of the public employees. In contrast, the private sector 
studies stress the personal characteristics of employees and only occa-
sionally incorporate characteristics of the employer or the industry (e.g., 
establishment size, concentration ratios, capital/labor ratios). 
Finally, because public sector studies tend to utilize bargaining 
unit data, their focus is often on how various characteristics of the 
environment in which bargaining takes place (e.g., city size, form of 
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government, formal parity agreements) influence the effects of col-
lective bargaining. In contrast, although a few private sector studies 
have looked at how the structure of collective bargaining (multiemployer, 
union competition, etc.) affect union/nonunion wage differential estimates, 
most have stressed how these differentials vary with individual worker 
characteristics (e.g., race, sex, age, education, occupation). 
Most studies of the effects of collective bargaining on SLG employees' 
wages are based explicitly, or implicitly, on a rather simple conceptual 
framework. Based upon a utility maximizing model of government behavior, 
the demand for public employees is specified to be a function of the wage 
costs of public employees (W) and a vector of sociodemographic and 
economic variables (Z) that represent the determinants of both the 
fiscal capacity (or ability to pay) of residents of the jurisdiction and 
the relative preferences of the community for various public services. 
Similarly, the supply of public employees is specified to be a function of 
the wages paid to public employees and another vector of sociodemographic 
and economic variables (V), that reflect alternative wages in the private 
sector and those forces that influence applicants' relative nonpecuniary 
preferences and qualifications for public sector employment. In the absence 
of imperfections in the labor market, one can then solve for the market 
clearing wage (W ). However, given the presence of unions and political 
and institutional forces (e.g., form of government, monopsony power, 
parity agreements), which may be represented by a vector of variables (X), 
the actual wage equation to be estimated is specified as 
(1) W = F(Z ,V ,X ,U ) + e 
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where the i subscript is used to denote a bargaining unit, U. is some 
measure of collective bargaining (to be discussed shortly) and e. is a 
random error term. 
Tables 1 and 2 present a nonexhaustive survey of studies published 
between 1970 and 1983 that estimate equations similar to equation (1). The 
former contains estimates for public school teachers, while the latter 
focuses on various categories of noneducational employees. Most of 
the studies use individual bargaining units as the units of observation, 
although some of the early teacher studies used statewide data, one 
study of hospital employees did some analyses using SMSA-wide data, and 
several studies use data on individuals from the Current Population 
13 Survey. In the main they are cross-section studies in which the extent 
of unionization or collective bargaining coverage is taken as exogenous. 
However, a number of the studies allow the unionization variable to be 
endogenous, in the context of models that seek to control for selection 
14 bias. In addition, at least one of the studies performs some analyses 
using two years' data and a fixed effects model, to eliminate the biases 
caused by unobserved variables that may be correlated with collective 
15 bargaining coverage. 
The unionization variable in these equations varies across studies. 
Some use a (1,0) variable to indicate whether collective bargaining 
negotiations take place. Others use a (1,0) variable to signify whether 
a formal contract governs wages and conditions of employment. Still 
others look at union membership, focusing on either the percentage of 
employees who are union members or whether any employees are union members. 
In each case, however, the estimates reported in the final column of the 
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tables may be interpreted as our estimates (based upon their results) of 
what Jacob Mincer (1981) has called the "wage gap;" the relative wage 
differential associated with the union variable taking on the value of 
one rather than zero. 
What is most striking is how small most of these numbers are! The 
estimated relative wage differentials associated with union membership 
or collective bargaining coverage are typically smaller than 10 percent 
and rarely exceed 20 percent. These estimates are considerably lower 
than the estimates obtained from private sector studies and they suggest that 
the relative wage effects of unions have been less in the public sector 
than the private sector. In addition, the two studies that use data on 
individuals, rather than on bargaining units, tend to find that the 
union/nonunion relative wage differential increased between the early 
and late 1970s. Most students of public sector labor relations find 
this latter result strange since their consensus was that while public 
sector unions may have won large wage gains in the early years of bargain-
ing when municipal employers were not fully prepared to bargain, over time 
these gains have eroded. 
What accounts for these two findings? Does collective bargaining 
really have a smaller effect on union/nonunion wage differentials in the 
public than private sector and have the public sector differentials grown 
over time? Or are there methodological problems with these studies which 
may account at least partially for the results? 
Turning first to the question of the size of the union/nonunion wage 
differential in the public sector, on the one hand we should stress once 
again that the laws governing dispute resolution in the public sector differ 
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from those in the private sector. Most states prohibit strikes by public 
employees which may weaken their bargaining power and should lead to 
lower observed union/nonunion differentials. Other states, however, 
provide for alternative forms of dispute resolution and, as discussed 
below, some provide for binding arbitration, either of a conventional or 
a final offer form, as the terminal stage of their impasse procedures. 
The literature we review below suggests that the nature of the impasse 
procedures available may well affect the bargaining power of unions. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, there are no studies that have empirically 
looked at how the nature of impasse procedures affects the union/nonunion 
wage differential; this represents a fertile area for future research. In 
any case, the smaller estimated differentials in the public sector may 
reflect smaller actual differentials caused by the different nature 
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of the laws governing bargaining in the sector. 
On the other hand, several methodological problems may cause 
these studies to understate public sector unions' impact on their members' 
relative wages. First, most of these studies ignore the interdependence 
of wage settlements across different public sector bargaining units in 
the same city (e.g., police, fire, sanitation) and the interdependence of 
wage settlements across geographic areas (e.g., cities in an SMSA) for a 
given category of employees (e.g., police). Such occupational and 
geographic wage interrelationships lead union wage gains to "spillover" 
across bargaining units in a given city and across contiguous cities. 
Studies that take account of these spillovers often find much larger 
union relative wage effects. For example, Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) 
found union/nonunion wage differentials in the range of 6 to 16 percent 
12 
for various categories of municipal noneducational employees in 1967 when 
they considered only the unionization of employees in the category. In 
contrast, when occupational spillovers of union wage gains were permitted, 
the estimated union/nonunion wage differentials in cities where all 
categories of municipal employees were organized rose to the range of 
20 to 32 percent. The same study also illustrated the importance of 
geographic spillovers finding that when a matched set of central city and 
suburban observations were used that, on average, the presence of a public 
sector union in a category in one city of the pair caused wages of 
employees in the category in the other city in the pair to be significantly 
higher. 
More recent studies have confirmed these findings suggesting that 
unionization of police influences firefighter and sanitation wages (Victor 
(1979)), that unionization of one category of hospital employees leads to 
higher relative wages for other categories of hospital employees (Feldman 
and Scheffler (1982), Cain, et al. (1981), Becker (1981)) and that the 
extent of collective bargaining coverage in a geographic area (e.g., an 
SMSA) often has a larger effect on public sector wages in a bargaining 
unit than does the extent of organization in that unit (Chambers (1977), 
Cain, et al. (1981)). In sum, ignoring the presence of occupational and 
geographic wage spillovers may well have caused most researchers to under-
estimate the magnitude of public sector union/nonunion wage differentials. 
Second, most public sector wage studies have treated collective 
bargaining coverage as exogenous. However, one might expect employee 
pressure for organization to come first in cities where public sector 
wages are below average for cities with comparable sociodemographic and 
economic characteristics. If this is the case, subsequently contrasting 
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wages in those cities where unions are present to those in which unions 
are not present will understate the true public sector union/nonunion 
wage differential. 
Attempts to allow for the endogeneity of collective bargaining 
coverage have not all yielded similar results. Cain, et al. (1981) and 
Ehrenberg, et al. (1983) estimated union/nonunion wage differentials in 
the context of models that corrected for selectivity bias; neither found 
systematically larger differentials using such models. Ichniowski (1980) 
used a fixed-effects model and panel data to eliminte the effects of any 
unobservable variables that might be correlated with both collective 
bargaining coverage and wages and again found that such a method did not 
significantly affect his estimated differential. However, Bartel and Lewin 
(1981) did find much larger estimated differentials when unionization was 
made endogenous. 
Third, most of the studies summarized in Tables 1 and 2 have tended 
to focus on hourly or annual earnings, rather than fringe benefits or 
total compensation. Might such a focus understate the relative union/ 
nonunion compensation differentials in the public sector? Studies of 
union effects in the private sector have often found that union/nonunion 
relative total compensation or fringe benefit differentials exceed union/ 
nonunion wage differentials (e.g., Freeman (1981)); an explanation for this 
result is that unions serve a collective voice function and can help to 
aggregate the preferences of individual workers for fringes and communicate 
these preferences to management. Since in the public sector the ultimate 
financers of settlements (taxpayers) are not explicitly represented at the 
bargaining table and since it may be easier to hide the true costs of generous 
14 
fringe benefit settlements than wage settlements from taxpayers (via 
underfunding of pensions or withholding information on the "true" costs of 
fringes), one might expect union compensation gains to be skewed even more 
towards fringes in the public sector. 
In fact, there is some evidence that this may have occurred. For 
example, Ichniowski (1980) found the relative union/nonunion fringe benefit 
(as measured by contributions to retirement and insurance benefits) differen-
tials for firefighters to be roughly four times as large as the comparable 
wage differential; a relationship which is much larger than that found by 
Freeman (1981) in his private sector studies. Edwards and Edwards (1982b) 
similarly found much larger fringe differentials than wage differentials 
for sanitation workers. Other investigators, however (e.g., Bartel and 
Lewin (1981), Becker (1979), Feldman and Scheffler (1982), Cain, et al. 
(1981)), found union/nonunion fringe differentials for hospital employees 
and police that appear to exceed the union/nonunion wage differential 
19 
by only a small amount. So while union/nonunion relative wage differen-
tial estimates in the public sector probably do understate the comparable 
total compensation differentials, it is not obvious that the understatement 
is greater here than in the private sector. 
Finally, while most recent studies of union relative wage effects in 
the private sector have used data on the wages paid to specific individuals, 
studies in the public sector have tended to focus on minimum, maximum, or 
average salaries for a particular category of public employees. If public 
sector unions are dominated by senior workers, one might expect to observe 
smaller union/nonunion differentials at the entrance than at the maximum 
salary levels. Moreover, if public employers respond to union induced 
wage gains that are skewed to favor older workers by seeking to increase 
the proportion of their workforces that are younger workers, estimated 
15 
union/nonunion average salary differentials will also be less than maximum 
salary differentials and may actually be less than minimum salary dif-
20 ferentials. If public sector wage studies focused primarily on average 
salaries, this might partially explain the lower union/nonunion wage 
differentials observed in the public sector. 
Although many public sector studies, especially those for noneduca-
tional employees have focused on average earnings, others have focused on 
minimum and maximum salaries. A quick reading of Tables 1 and 2 also 
suggests that the union/nonunion wage differentials estimated from the 
latter studies are not appreciably higher than those estimated from the 
former. Moreover, the evidence on whether these differentials are actually 
larger for older than for younger workers is mixed. For example, Ehrenberg, 
et al. (1980) found differentials that were larger at the maximum salary 
level than at the minimum salary level for both police and firefighters. 
However, Ehrenberg (1973c) and Ichniowski (1980), for firefighters, and 
Bartel and Lewin (1981), for police, all found larger differentials at the 
minimum than at the maximum level. Similarly, with respect to teachers, 
while Thornton (1971) found larger differentials at the maximum level and 
Gustman and Segal (1977) found that teachers' unions were associated with a 
shorter length of time to reach maximum salaries, Chambers (1977) found 
positive union/nonunion differentials for starting salaries but not for 
increments, and Gallagher (1978) found differentials at the minimum and 
maximum level that were roughly equivalent. All in all then, the evidence 
on union effects on the seniority structure of compensation in the public 
sector is mixed. 
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We turn next to the question of whether the public sector union/ 
nonunion wage differential has grown over time. It must be stressed that 
the estimates that suggest it has come from studies that utilize data on 
individuals and that completely ignore information on the economic and 
sociodemographic characteristics of the cities in which public sector employees 
are located. We know from the bargaining unit studies cited in the 
tables that, ceteris paribus, public sector wages tend to be higher in 
large, densely populated cities. These cities also tend to be the 
cities in which collective bargaining arose first and in which it has grown 
most rapidly. Hence, even if the actual union/nonunion wage differential 
is constant across high and low wage cities at a point in time and does 
not vary over time for each type of city, it is straightforward to show that the 
21 22 
observed average union/nonunion wage differential will increase over time. ' 
Put another way, omitted variable problems may well have biased the studies 
based on individual data and we do not find the evidence that public sector 
union/nonunion wage differentials have increased over time compelling. 
As noted above, in addition to providing estimates of union/nonunion 
wage differentials, many of the studies of public sector wages have taken 
great care to emphasize the importance of various characteristics of the 
environment in which bargaining takes place. To take one example, numerous 
studies have sought to estimate whether public employers have monopsony 
power, focusing on measures like the number of school districts in a county 
(Baird and Landon (1972)), the percentage of a SMSA's population which 
resides in a jurisdiction (Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975)), or concentra-
tion ratios such as the fraction of an area's hospital beds in the four 
largest hospitals in an area (Feldman and Scheffler (1982)). To the extent 
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that variables like these are good proxies for monopsony power, the first 
should be positively associated with wages and the latter two negatively 
associated; these and other studies suggest this it the case. 
To take another example, a set of studies has focused on the effects 
of form of government on wages. Historically, at least partially because 
of the belief that professionally trained managers could "produce" a desired 
set of services at lower cost than could an elected nonprofessional, a sub-
stantial proportion of all U.S. cities have chosen to employ a city-manager 
as the principle operating officer rather than an elected mayor or set of 
commissioners. If professionally trained managers are better negotiators, 
are more aware of market conditions, and/or are more efficient than elected 
officials in "producing" public services from a given number of employees, 
one might expect that city-manager cities would have lower wage costs than 
other municipalities and that union/nonunion wage differentials would be 
lower in them, ceteris paribus, for employees of comparable quality. 
To date, however, only one study, Edwards and Edwards (1982b) found 
that the form of local government affects the size of union/nonunion wage 
differentials. In particular, it found that union/nonunion differentials 
for municipal sanitation workers are zero in city-manager run cities but 
positive in other cities. Moreover, the evidence on the effect of govern-
mental form on salary levels is mixed. Ehrenberg (1973) found city-manager 
cities had lower hourly wages for firefighters but higher annual salaries, 
while Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) replicated the latter result for ten 
different categories of noneducational municipal employees. More recently, 
Edwards and Edwards (1982b) and Bartel and Lewin (1981) have studied sani-
tation and police employees, respectively, finding city-manager cities had 
higher wages and fringes in the former case and that the form of government 
did not affect salary levels in the latter case. 
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Finally, a number of studies have examined how the effects of specific 
collective bargaining contract provisions, such as parity provisions that 
require that two groups of employees (e.g., police patrolmen and fire-
fighters) receive the same wages, affect wage settlements. Some have also 
begun to look at how municipal laws, such as civil service laws, residency 
requirements that mandate that public employees live in the municipality 
where they work, or prevailing wage laws that at least partially determine 
wages via reference to comparability studies, affect wages. 
The evidence on the effects of parity provisions not surprisingly 
suggests that they positively influence the wages of groups that are in 
excess supply, but negatively influence the wages of groups that are in 
excess demand (e.g., Ehrenberg (1973), Hall and Vanderporten (1977)). 
The evidence on the effects of civil service laws suggests they are 
associated with higher wages. Finally, with respect to the effects of 
municipal laws, studies have been conducted by Werner Hirsch and Anthony 
Rufolo (1975; 1983a; 1983b); a conceptual framework is presented in their 
first paper and some empirical results in their latter papers. So far-
however, they have not found strong evidence that these laws have sta-
tistically significant effects. 
The last group of studies are suggestive of a direction in which 
future research on public sector wage determination might proceed—to more 
fully analyze the relationship between the legal environment, public sector 
wages, and public sector union/nonunion wage differentials. The legal 
environment includes state statutes governing public sector dispute resolu-
tion; as noted above there have been no studies of the effects of dispute 
resolution statutes on union/nonunion differentials and only a limited 
number (to be discussed below) of their effects on the level of wage 
settlements. 
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Dispute resolution statutes are only one part of the environment, 
however. Surprisingly no one has addressed the effects of a host of other 
laws. Some states require taxpayers to approve local school budgets at 
annual budget referenda, while others do not. In the wake of the passage 
of Proposition 13 in California in the early 1970s, some states now have 
limitations on state or local taxes and/or expenditure levels, while others 
do not. Some state constitutions require that state governments operate 
balanced budgets, while others do not. Finally, some states have agency 
shop provisions in their public sector bargaining laws that require public 
employees to join the union representing them or pay the equivalent of dues, 
while other states explicitly prohibit such provisions (Hanslowe, et al. 
(1978)). Surely these laws should all be expected to influence public 
sector union bargaining power and hence the level of wages. 
The fact that these laws vary across states provides a form of 
natural experiment that should allow researchers to investigate their 
effects on wage levels and differentials. Of course, the possibility 
that the laws are endogenous should be considered and appropriate econo-
metric methodologies used. To analyze the effects of such laws obviously 
requires a national sample of bargaining units; it is interesting that 
many of the studies cities in Table 1 were confined to a single state. 
III. Unions and Productivity 
Recently a number of economists have directed their attention to 
estimating the effects of unions and collective bargaining on nonwage 
outcomes in the public sector. As is well known, the traditional neo-
classical view of unions is that by creating noncompensating wage 
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differentials and negotiating work rules that limit employers' flexibility 
to allocate resources, unions cause efficiency losses. In contrast, draw-
ing on hypotheses put forth long ago by institutional economists, the 
"Harvard School" holds that unions may well increase productivity via a 
number of routes including reducing turnover, increasing morale and moti-
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vation, and expanding formal and informal on-the-job training. Indeed, 
several studies, summarized in Chapter of this Handbook suggest that 
union/nonunion productivity differentials in the private sector are often 
positive. It is natural to similarly ask then, what the effects of unions 
have been on productivity in the public sector. 
Figure 1 presents a simple schematic diagram that illustrates the 
routes via which unions affect productivity. Unionization and the collec-
tive bargaining process per se leads to the establishment of union contract 
provisions (grievance, seniority, staffing, sick leave, wages, etc.). These pro^  
visions directly influence both employer and employee resource allocation 
decisions in areas such as turnover, training, absenteeism, and the nature 
of the production process and managerial behavior. Unionization per se 
may also influence these decisions independent of any specific contract 
provisions; for example, management behavior may be altered due to the 
mere presence of a union. Finally, the sum of these resource allocation 
decisions may affect output. 
This figure highlights a number of important points. First, unions 
affect productivity both through the specific union contract provisions 
they negotiate and administer and via the unions' mere presence. A com-
plete analysis would focus on both routes, however, as will be seen 
below, most public sector studies have focused on estimating the effects 
of a specific set of provisions or the sum of the effects of unionization 
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across the two routes. Second, because the unit of observation in the 
public sector is the bargaining unit and public sector labor contracts 
are often readily available, one would expect much more analyses of the 
effects of contract provisions to have occurred in the public sector than 
in the private sector. To some extent this has occurred; while private sector 
studies have focused on (1,0) collective bargaining coverage variables, a 
number of the public sector studies have examined contract provisions. 
Third, the difficulties involved in trying to measure output and specify 
production functions in the public sector are well-known. As such, one 
might expect much of the public sector research to focus on the effect 
of unions on resource allocation decisions, rather than on productivity, 
per se, and this in fact has also occurred. 
Turning first to studies that have attempted to estimate the 
effects of unions on productivity in the public sector, these have all 
been single year cross-section studies that treat collective bargaining 
coverage or unionization only as a (1,0) variable and that use a pro-
duction-function or derived demand for public services approach. For 
example, Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) and Ehrenberg, Sherman and Schwarz 
(1983) focused on municipal public libraries because of the availability 
of various measures of output (circulation, interlibrary loans, borrowers, 
etc.) and found no union/nonunion productivity differential. A similar 
result was found by Noam (1983), who studied municipal building depart-
ments, using the number of building permits granted and the volume of con-
struction supervised as measures of output. 
Sherman (1983) and Eberts and Stone (forthcoming) studied elementary 
and secondary schools, using various student test scores as measures of 
output. The former found that unions were associated with significantly 
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lower mean test scores for students and a higher variance of test scores. 
The latter, who used data on individuals, found that unions were associated 
with higher test scores for "average" students but lower test scores for 
both below and above average students. Both of these studies were based 
upon the work of Brown and Saks (1975), who emphasized that school districts 
and teachers must make decisions about the allocation of resources across 
different categories of students. As a result, when one observes unions 
being associated with both the mean and variance of educational outcomes in 
aggregate district-wide data or having different associations with various 
categories of students when individual data is used, it is difficult to 
disentangle unions' effects on the educational production function from 
their effects on how resources are allocated across students. 
In principle, such production function estimates could be extended to 
other public services, for example, police, fire and sanitation, for which 
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measures of "output" can be obtained. One must remember, however, that 
the association of union coverage with productivity does not imply a causal 
relationship; of the above studies, only Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983) and 
Ehrenberg, Sherman and Schwarz (1983) considered the endogeneity of unioni-
zation, modelling it in a sample selection framework. Future research in 
this tradition must continue to consider this problem, using either a 
similar approach and/or longitudinal data, that would permit one to use a 
fixed-effects model to control for unobservables correlated with both 
union coverage and output. 
Turning next to the studies of union effects on resource allocation, 
these have focused almost exclusively on public education and again have 
been primarily cross-sectional in nature. Eberts (forthcoming) used data 
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from a national sample of elementary school teachers and principals in 
the mid-1970s and found that teachers in unionized schools spent less time 
per school year in instructional activities and more time on preparation, 
administration and parent conferences. He also found that unionized dis-
tricts had more teachers and administrators per student (but fewer secre-
taries and aids), a result that contrasts with Hall and Carroll's (1973) 
finding of lower teacher/student ratios in unionized school districts in 
Cook County, Illinois in 1968-69. 
Most of the studies in this area, however, have focused on the 
effects of specific contract provisions. For example, Winkler (1980) 
found that various contract provisions relating to sick leave policy 
were associated with the number of short-term absences observed for a 
sample of Wisconsin and California teachers. Murnane (1981a) studied the 
turnover of public school teachers in a system in which pay was determined 
strictly by seniority and found that the seniority provision did not 
cause the more productive teachers, as measured by principals' evaluations 
and/or the teachers' effects on student performance, to quit their jobs 
more frequently. 
Eberts (1982b) also focused on teacher turnover, studying whether 
contract provisions that specify maximum class sizes, and those that 
specify that reductions in force (RIF) due to declining enrollment be 
governed by seniority, affect the probability either that teachers voluntarily 
leave their school district or that they transfer from one school to another 
within a district. Using data from a sample of 19,000 teachers in New 
York State over the 1972-76 period, he found that class size provisions 
were associated with fewer quits but more within-district transfers. As 
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might be expected, RIF provisions were associated with a lower proba-
bility that experienced teachers would leave the school district (these 
teachers would have relatively more job security under RIF's) but a higher 
probability that teachers with little seniority would leave. In related 
work, using data at the school district level in New York State, Eberts 
(1982a) found that districts with RIF provisions experienced, ceteris 
paribus, a smaller reduction in the level of resources available for 
education during a period of declining enrollments and fiscal stress 
(1972-76). Similarly, Eberts (1983) found that an index of the 
number of contract provisions contained in a contract and the presence 
of a set of specific provisions were all associated with a larger share 
of the school budget being devoted to instructional purposes, ceteris 
paribus, during the 1976-77 school year. 
While these latter studies are useful first efforts, they have at 
least three limitations. First, we have been careful to use the words 
"associated with" rather than "cause" when talking about the contract 
provision studies because, save for Eberts (1982a), none of them allow 
for the possibility that some omitted variables influence both the contract 
provisions and the resource allocation decisions. Again, what seems called 
for is an explicit simultaneous equations approach or the use of longitudinal 
data that would permit the estimation of a fixed effects model. If the 
latter approach is used, one would want to focus on how changes in contract 
provisions affect changes in outcomes, differencing out the fixed effects. 
If the former approach is used, one could explicitly address the issue of 
how state laws governing public sector collective bargaining and dispute 
resolution affect resource allocation. 
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Second, while these studies are a substantial improvement over 
prior private and public sector studies that focus on (1,0) union 
variables, they do not go quite as far as they might. Virtually all use 
(1,0) variables to parameterize specific contract provisions when often 
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more detailed data is available. Is it the presence of a maximum class 
size provision or the level of the maximum student/teacher ratio that 
matters? Future studies should try to parameterize contract provisions 
in a more detailed fashion. 
Finally, all of these contract provision studies deal with resource 
allocation decisions, but most make no attempt to evaluate how these 
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decisions subsequently affect output or productivity. What is obviously 
needed, for example, is estimates of public sector "production functions" 
that include variables such as absentee rate or turnover rates in the 
production function. Alternatively, one might ignore such variables and 
directly estimate "quasi reduced-form" production functions in which the 
underlying contract provisions appeared explicitly. But again, here 
account must be taken of possible simultaneity between contract provisions 
and productivity. 
IV. Compensating Wage Differentials in the Public Sector 
The realization that the total compensation of labor includes a host 
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary job characteristics, as well as money wages, 
naturally led students of public sector labor markets to consider the 
issue of compensating wage differentials. The studies in this area break 
down neatly into two sets; the first deals with the trade-off between public 
school teachers' wages and nonpecuniary job characteristics, while the 
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second deals with the trade-off between wages and retirement system charac-
teristics for police, fire, and sanitation workers. 
The teacher studies were motivated at least partially by concerns 
over educational equity. If teachers in school districts with, say, a pre-
ponderance of low-income or minority students demanded, and received, 
higher wages to compensate them for the disamenities they perceived to be 
associated with working with such students, then equal expenditures per 
pupil across school districts would leave these districts able to afford 
only lower teacher/student ratios than other districts. Thus, knowledge of 
whether such compensating wage differentials exist is essential for the 
formulation of state-aid-to-education policies. 
The methodological approach used in these studies, and those discussed 
below, on the wage/fringe trade-off, is a straightforward application of 
Rosen's (1974) hedonic price approach. Using cross-section data, equations 
of the form 
(2) log V± = f (X±) + Y C ± + e± 
are estimated, where W. is some measure of earnings for the i teacher 
or school district, X. is a vector of teacher and community character-
istics expected to influence earnings in the absence of any compensating 
wage differentials, C. is a pecuniary or nonpecuniary job characteristic 
(in practice a vector of such characteristics is often used) and e is a 
random error term. A positive (negative) coefficient on a perceived job 
disamenity (amenity) is interpreted as indicating the presence of a compen-
sating wage differential. Rosen is careful to stress, as have other 
researchers that followed (e.g., R. Smith (1979)), that the estimated 
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trade-off curve per se reflects only a market-equilibrium curve; in itself 
it identifies neither employees' demand prices nor employers' supply 
prices for the characteristics. We will return to this point below. 
The best known of these studies, Antos and Rosen (1975), used cross-
section data on individual teachers from the 1965 Equality of Educational 
Opportunity Survey and included teacher, school, neighborhood, and geographic 
characteristics, as explanatory variables. A major finding was that white 
teachers were paid higher wages in areas with high proportions of nonwhite 
students. Similar results were found by Gustman and Clement (1977), who 
used data for 83 inner city school districts, and Toder (1972), who used 
data for Massachusetts cities and towns; both studies suggested that 
average teacher salaries in a district were higher, the higher the propor-
tion of nonwhite students. Kenny and Denslow (1980) failed to find such 
a relationship in data spanning 1419 southern school districts, but they 
did find that (dis)amenities such as the crime rate and the climate in an 
area were significantly related to salaries. 
Studies of the wage/retirement system characteristics trade-off for 
police, fire, and sanitation employees were motivated by concerns about 
whether taxpayers or public employees would pay the costs of proposed 
public sector pension reform legislation which, like the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act that applies to the private sector, might call 
for improved vesting and funding requirements. One needs to know the extent 
to which such rules, that would increase employers' pension costs, would 
be shifted onto employees in the form of lower wages. Estimation of an 
equation in which public employee wage scales are regressed on retirement 
system characteristics and variables that previous studies have shown to 
influence public employee wages (see section II) would permit one to 
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ascertain whether public employers actually do shift pension costs on to 
their employees. 
While it is straightforward to show that an increase in any pension 
plan characteristic that increases an employer's costs should lead, ceteris 
paribus, to decreased wages, as should a decrease in the employees' pension 
contribution, it is somewhat less obvious why and how pension funding 
should affect wages. The answer depends upon how employers and employees 
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perceive underfunding. Employers may regard underfunding as merely borrow-
ing from the future—that is, creating a future liability with a present 
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value equal to the amount of underfunding. With such a perception employers 
would not offer high wages in the event of underfunding; no wage-underfunding 
trade-off would exist. 
Public sector employers, however, may regard underfunding as cost-
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saving, at least to the currently elected administration. They may, 
for example, believe that higher levels of government will "bail-out" 
funds whose pensioners face nonreceipt of benefits. They may also reason 
that the financial crisis is 15 to 20 years in the future and therefore 
well past the time when they will be in office. In either case, employers 
regarding underfunding as cost-saving will be willing to pay higher wages 
if they choose to underfund. 
Now if employees are unaware of underfunding or believe it will have 
no effect on their expected pension benefits, they will essentially ignore 
underfunding in their choice of employers and go for the highest paying 
job (ceteris paribus). The highest wages, other things equal, will be 
paid by the biggest underfunders. Large-scale underfunders would dominate 
in their ability to attract employees and a Gresham's Law of pensions 
would exist: poorly funded retirement systems would drive out well 
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funded ones. We would observe near-total underfunding by all public 
employers. 
If employees are aware, however, of underfunding and perceive it to 
reduce their expected benefits, they would demand higher wages to compen-
sate for additional underfunding. Employees who require a large wage 
increase for a given increment of underfunding would choose to work for 
the better-funded employers, while those who require only a small wage 
increase would work for the poorest funders. We would observe both a 
positive wage-underfunding trade-off in the labor market and the coexis-
tence of retirement systems in which funding practices vary widely. In 
fact, this is the only case where a wage-underfunding trade-off would be 
observed; in the other cases employers are either unwilling to make the 
trade-off or are clustered at some near-maximum level of underfunding. 
Attempts to test for the trade-off between wages and retirement 
system characteristics, including the degree of underfunding have been 
made by a number of investigators who have estimated variants of 
equation (2). Ehrenberg (1980a) used data on police and firefighters 
from roughly 130 cities of populations of 50,000 or more, drawn from a 
1973 International City Management Association survey and other sources, 
to test for the effects of several pension plan characteristics—minimum 
age and service requirements for regular retirement, percentage of salary 
received for regular retirement, and employees' pension contributions as 
a fraction of their salary—on public-sector wages. His strongest finding 
was that, holding promised pension benefits and other variables expected 
to affect wages constant, police and firefighters appeared to be fully com-
pensated in the form of higher wages, on virtually a dollar-for-dollar 
basis for increases in their own pension contributions. He also performed 
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a limited analysis of the effect of underfunding on wages, finding that a 
set of proxy variables for the extent of underfunding was correlated with 
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wages. 
In the same paper, Ehrenberg also analyzed data from a 1975 U.S. 
Conference of Mayors survey of 262 cities with populations of 25,000 or 
more to test for wage-retirement system characteristics trade-offs among 
fire, police, and sanitation workers. Perhaps his most important finding 
was that, ceteris paribus, the presence of vesting led to a 3-9 percent 
decrease in wages. 
R. Smith (1981) tested the predictions of the theory on data for non-
uniformed employees enrolled in Pennsylvania's city and county retirement 
systems. These data include actuarial calculations of the "normal cost 
of pension promises" and the extent of underfunding. Smith found that, 
ceteris paribus, increases in normal service costs reduced wages virtually 
dollar-for-dollar and increases in the extent of underfunding increased 
wages, again virtually dollar-for-dollar. In a second paper 
he performed similar analyses for uniformed employees finding that again 
underfunding led to higher wages, but this time at a less than dollar-
33 
for-dollar trade-off. 
Finally, Inman (1981) used pooled data for police and firefighters 
in 60 large cities for the 1970-73 fiscal years and provided estimates of 
a simultaneous equations system that included a wage equation (like 
equation (2)), an employment equation, a pension contribution per employee, 
and a unionization equation. He found that underfunding led to higher 
wages for police, but not for firefighters. However, even in the former 
case, the trade-off was less than dollar-for-dollar. 
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While providing useful insights, these studies of the wage-nonpecuniary 
job characteristic and wage-retirement system characteristics trade-offs 
suffer from a number of methodological short-comings, which are common to 
virtually all private sector studies of compensating wage differentials as 
well. First, in spite of the fact that the underlying hedonic structure 
yields no strong implications about the functional form of the equation 
to be estimated, little experimentation is typically done with alternative 
34 functional forms to see how robust the findings actually are. Second, 
although in theory all pecuniary and nonpecuniary job characteristics 
should appear in equations like (2), in practice only a subset actually 
appear. So, for example, most of the teacher studies, which focus on 
nonpecuniary job characteristics, omit fringe benefit data, and most of 
the retirement characteristics studies omit nonpecuniary job charac-
teristics data. To the extent that various dimensions of pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary compensation are correlated, the potential arises for biased 
estimates of the coefficients of the trade-offs. 
Third, there is an obvious simultaneity problem that most studies 
have totally ignored. Returning to equation (2), the true model is that 
total compensation, which is assumed to be a linear combination of the 
logarithm of wages and the job characteristic (C), is a function of the 
vector X plus a random error term (e). For estimation purposes, 
however, C is moved to the right-hand side and equation (2) is estimated. 
Since increases in the random error term lead to increases in total com-
pensation, the possibility that the error term is positively correlated 
with C and thus that the coefficient y is biased in a positive direc-
tion is strong. In cases where the job characteristics is an amenity 
(disamenity) and this coefficient is hypothesized to be negative (positive), 
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one will consequently understate (overstate) the absolute magnitude of 
the trade-off. 
Three attempts have been made to handle this latter problem. Ehrenberg 
(1980) returned the vector C back to the left-hand side of the equation 
and estimated the resulting equation using canonical correlation analysis. 
While such an approach seemed to "improve" his results, since no tests of 
significance are available for individual coefficients in canonical correla-
tion analysis, he could not draw any firm conclusions. Eberts and Stone 
(1983) investigated the trade-off between wages and other job characteristics 
for teachers in New York State using panel data and a fixed effects model; 
35 the hope is that any omitted variables were constant over time. 
Finally, Woodbury (1983) used data from a sample of 2,500 school 
districts in 1977 to estimate wage-fringe trade-offs. However, rather 
than estimating market trade-off curves like (2), he used a translog 
indirect utility function and attempted to directly estimate teachers' 
marginal rates of substitution of wages for fringes. As Rosen (1974) 
emphasizes, the the conditions under which market observations can be 
used to directly infer marginal rates of substitution for one side of the 
market (i.e., employee or employer) is rather stringent and it is not clear 
that they are met in this case. In particular, Woodbury's approach seems 
to require that employers will be willing to trade-off fringes for wages 
in a constant linear manner, a condition which is unlikely to hold if 
fringes affect teacher productivity. 
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V. The Demand for Labor in the Public Sector 
The motivation for existing studies of the demand for labor in the 
state and local government sector is two-fold. First, to provide estimates 
of wage elasticities of demand for various categories of SLG employees to 
shed light on the question of whether the same market forces that constrain 
union power in the private sector would exist in the public sector, if the 
same institutional rules governed collective bargaining in both sectors. 
Second, to provide estimates of the extent to which federal funds provided 
to state and local governments under public service employment programs were 
actually used to increase SLG employment. That is, to what extent did these 
funds create new jobs and to what extent were they used to hire people who 
would have been hired anyway? 
Turning first to the estimates of wage elasticities of demand, the 
earliest studies are surprisingly more faithful to economic theory than 
the ones that followed, in the sense that they provide estimates of com-
plete systems of demand equations based upon utility maximization models 
that permit one to test, or impose, the restrictions suggested by classical 
demand theory. For example, Ehrenberg (1972) (1973a) provided estimates 
of the demand for eleven categories of SLG employees based upon a utility-
maximizing model of a representative decision-maker who derives utility 
37 from various categories of public and private produced goods and services. 
Ehrenberg's estimates were based on a variant of the Stone-Geary utility 
function that allowed for minimum required employment levels in each 
category; these were specified to be a function of lagged employment 
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levels and this specification allowed him to test for the presence of 
38 incremental budgeting. Similarly, Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975) used 
a variant of the Rotterdam, or differential demand system to test if the 
restrictions implied by classical demand theory (homogeneity, symmetry, 
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and Engel aggregation) were met. 
Each of these studies used pooled cross-section time-series data 
at the state level for the 1958-59 period. They attempted to control for 
differences in tastes for public services across areas by including a 
vector of sociodemographic variables (population density, school age 
population, etc.) as controls in the estimating equations and/or by 
segmenting the data by the values of these variables. Aggregate time-
series evidence for 1929 to 1973 on the demand for all SLG employees was 
provided by Ashenfelter (1979) in a later paper. Finally, two recent 
papers have focused on specific groups of educational employees; Thornton 
(1979) used cross-section state data for academic years 1968-69 to 
1973-74 to study the demand for public school teachers, while Chang and 
Hsing (1982) used pooled cross-section time-series data for 12 southeastern 
states during the 1967-76 period to study the demand for college faculty 
in public universities. All of these studies, save for Ashenfelter (1975) 
treated public employees' wages as predetermined and ignored supply side 
considerations. 
The estimated wage elasticities from these studies are summarized 
in Table 3. In the main they suggest that demand curves for labor 
in the SLG sector are inelastic. However, the estimated elasticities do 
not appear to be substantially lower in absolute value than the private 
sector wage elasticities, summarized in the Hamermesh paper in this volume. 
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Before one draws any conclusions from this about whether the market forces 
that constrain union wage demands are similar in the public and private 
sector, one should remember that an objective of unions is to make demand 
curves less elastic in order to improve the wage/employment trade-offs 
they face. To the extent that current public sector bargaining legisla-
tion limits unions' ability to pursue this objective, it is plausible 
that in a less restrictive environment public sector labor demand curves 
would prove to be less elastic. 
In fact, this suggests an obvious deficiency in the public sector 
labor demand literature. It is well-known that public sector unions seek 
through the collective bargaining process to reduce the substitutability 
of capital for labor; for example, by establishing maximum student/teacher 
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ratios in education or minimum patrolmen per patrol car ratios. Public 
employees are also voters and, through the political process, may seek to 
41 increase the demand for their own services. One might expect that public 
employee unions, via the lobbying route and their support of favorable 
legislation would further seek to increase the demand for public employees. 
Yet in spite of these observations, there have been virtually no studies 
that explicitly deal with the effects of unions on the levels, or wage 
elasticities, of public sector labor demand curves. There have also been 
virtually no studies which examine whether the form of local government 
similarly influences the public sector demand for labor; why city managers 
might affect the demand for public employees was discussed in section 
i i . 4 2 
Several other omissions in this literature are also obvious. Most 
of the existing studies have used data from the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, in the wake of proposition 13 in California and 
tax and expenditure limitation legislation subsequently passed in other 
states, there have been no studies that examine whether the presence of 
such legislation per se influences the demand for labor in the public 
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sector. The updated studies required to answer such a question would 
also be useful in that they would enable one to test if public sector 
wage elasticities are more elastic in times of fiscal stringency than 
they are in expansionary periods. Finally, as in the case of the public 
sector wage determination studies cited earlier, none of the demand 
studies have examined the role of other state legal or constitutional 
statutes (e.g., annual municipal budget referendum or balanced budget 
rules) on labor demand in the public sector. 
Turning next to the studies of the net job creation effects of 
public sector employment programs, the approaches here have been varied. 
One of the early studies, Johnson and Tomola (1977) used quarterly aggre-
gate data for the period 1966 to 1975 and asked what the effect of pro-
viding additional PSE positions would be on the aggregate level of SLG 
employment. Their estimating equation included seasonal dummies, a time 
trend, the real wage of public employees, personal income net of taxes and 
the percentage of the population that was of school age (to control for 
tastes for public education). Johnson and Tomola found that while 
initially PSE funds stimulated increased employment, the net job creation 
effects seemed to be close to zero after five quarters. That is, eventually 
the federal funds simply displaced, or were substituted for, local 
resources. Borus and Hamermesh (1978) then performed some reanalyses of 
the same data that illustrated how sensitive the aggregate time-series 
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results were to choice of lag structure, functional form, and sample 
period. That is, they concluded that little can be concluded from the 
aggregate time-series data. 
Two parallel studies using different methodologies also found 
quite different results. The first, an Urban Institute study (Bassi 
(1979), Bassi and Fechter (1979)), used cross-section data for cities, 
counties, and states for fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and a structural 
econometric model of SLG decision-making and found net job creation 
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effects in the range of 40 to 50 percent. The second, Richard Nathan, 
et al. (1981), was a noneconometric study based on the perceptions of 
field observers in 40 local governments and concluded that net job 
creation effects were in the range of 80 percent in fiscal years 1977 and 
1978. Finally, a third study, Charles Adams, et al. (1983), used pooled 
time-series cross-section data for 30 cities from FY 1970 to FY 1979 and 
concluded that of every dollar of PSE program funds, 30 percent actually 
went to increase local government wage bills in FY 1977, with the estimate 
rising to 70 percent in FY 1978 and FY 1979. 
Although the methodologies varies across these studies, the con-
sensus appears to be that the net job creation effects of the program 
increased over time. Put another way, as the PSE program evolved from 
its onset in 1973, the number of new jobs actually created per each 100 
positions funded seemed to increase. This is not surprising for, as 
Congress increasingly became aware of the possibility that federal funds 
could be used to substitute for, or displace, local funds, it continued 
to redesign the program in a way that limited such substitutions. For 
example, in the latter years of the program it became more difficult to 
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switch employees from regular municipal payrolls to the PSE ones and to 
employ people on PSE projects for extended periods of time. 
Several cautions are in order here, however. First, the Adams, 
et al. (1983) study focused on the total wage bill (payroll), not the 
municipal employment level. Thus, we have no way of knowing whether this 
study's results imply that PSE funds went for increased employment or for 
increased wages for existing employees. Indeed, one relatively unre-
searched area is the effect of federal grants on SLG employees wage levels, 
and the role unions play in this process. Second, since the Nathan, et al. 
(1981) study did not use formal statistical methods, no formal statements 
about statistical significance or confidence intervals can be associated 
with it. Finally, as Borus and Hamermesh (1978) note in the time-series 
context and Bassi and Fechter (1979) hint at in the cross-section context, 
many of these results are very sensitive to model specification, sample 
period, and choice of variables. Prudent researchers probably should not 
45 draw strong conclusions from this literature. 
VI. Dispute Resolution 
As noted in Section I, most states prohibit strikes by public 
employees, substituting instead a formal system of impasse procedures 
in which assistance is provided to local governments and unions to help 
them resolve collective bargaining disputes. For those categories of 
public services that are often thought to be essential (police and fire-
fighters) , a number of states have adopted forms of binding arbitration as 
the terminal stage of the impasse procedures. This takes the form of 
either conventional arbitration where the parties present their final posi-
tions and supporting evidence to an arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators) who 
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fashions a binding final settlement based upon the evidence and any other 
factors deemed to be relevant, or of final offer arbitration where the 
arbitrator is bound to issue a settlement that corresponds to the final 
position of one of the parties, either on a package (one party "wins") or 
issue-by-issue (each party may "win" on a number of issues) basis. 
These unique forms of public sector dispute resolution lead to a 
number of empirical research questions that economists and industrial rela-
tions specialists have devoted considerable resources to answering. For 
example, in spite of prohibitions against strikes in the public sector, 
strikes do occur and it is natural to study their determinants,including 
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state laws governing dispute resolution. 
To take another example, conventional arbitration statutes were 
introduced in the hope that they would reduce strike activity. But con-
cern is often expressed that these statutes will have a chilling effect 
on bargaining; if the parties believe that arbitrators' decisions tend to 
"split-the-difference" between their final positions, the parties will 
have reduced incentives to make concessions during bargaining since any 
concession would come back to haunt them if the dispute went to arbitra-
tion. As a result, conventional arbitration statutes may lead to a 
reduced level of bargaining and heavy use of the arbitration procedures. 
Final offer arbitration, where the "reasonableness" of a party's position 
influences the likelihood that the arbitrator chooses it was developed to 
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avoid this problem. 
These alternative forms of arbitration and the issues they raise 
lead naturally to the study of whether arbitrators tend to split the dif-
ference under conventional arbitration, whether a conventional arbitration 
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statute increases the probability of a dispute going to arbitration 
vis-a-vis a final offer statute, and whether arbitration statutes tend to 
have a narcotic or addictive effect, in the sense that once the parties 
go to arbitration, this increases the probability that they will go to 
arbitration again in future rounds? 
The empirical research addresses the outcomes of bargaining as well 
as the process itself. It is again natural to study whether the existence 
of an impasse procedure per se affects either the mean level or dispersion 
of contract settlements in a state, whether settlements systematically 
differ between bargaining units that use the procedures and those that 
settle on their own, and whether arbitrators exhibit bias in the sense that 
most of the cases that go to arbitration are won by one party (e.g., 
unions)? 
These questions are all important because industrial relations 
specialists tend to evaluate public sector impasse procedures by their 
effectiveness in inducing the parties to settle on their own (i.e., to not use 
the procedures) and by their effectiveness in not influencing the nature 
of the settlements. Before turning to the empirical evidence on these 
points, however, it is useful to remember that these are all somewhat ad 
hoc criteria. Indeed, recently a number of economists have provided 
analytical models of the arbitration process that suggest that some of 
these criteria may not be useful ones to focus on and we turn first to a 
discussion of these models. 
In a series of papers (Farber and Katz (1979), Farber (1980a)(1980b) 
(1981)) simple two-party zero-sum models of parties' bargaining over a 
single outcome are presented. The first, Farber and Katz (1979), considers 
the case where the parties form expectations of a conventional arbitrator's 
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award; each's expectation is assumed to be normally distributed and to have 
a specified mean and variance. Each party seeks to maximize its expected 
utility from the negotiations and risk aversion of the parties leads to a 
contract zone; a range of settlements that is preferred by both parties 
to facing the uncertainty of the arbitrator's decision. In this framework, 
uncertainty is the cost of the arbitration process that leads to the con-
tract zone and a key assumption of the model is that the larger the con-
tract zone is, the more likely the parties will settle on their own. As 
we shall discuss below, this is not an innocuous assumption. 
The Farber-Katz model leads immediately to two important implications. 
First, if over time the parties' uncertainty about arbitrators' decisions 
diminishes, the size of the contract zone and thus the probability the 
parties will settle on their own will also decrease. To avoid ever-
increasing use of the arbitration process, one must increase the cost to 
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the parties of using the process. Second, if one assumes that the bar-
gaining power of each party (the "share" of the contract zone the party 
will win in bargaining) is fixed, then necessarily the settlements that 
go to arbitration will differ from those where the parties settle on their 
own. This occurs because the more risk adverse party will willingly 
settle on its own for a smaller share of the pie to avoid the risks of 
going to arbitration. Thus, any difference observed between arbitrated 
and negotiated settlements does not indicate that the process is unfair. 
Rather, it suggests only that the arbitration process per se necessarily 
affects the nature of negotiated settlements. 
The Farber-Katz model takes the arbitrator's notion of a fair settle-
ment as given. Suppose instead that the arbitrator considers both the 
42 
"intrinsic" fairness and the parties' positions in framing his award, 
with deviations of the parties' positions from his notion of intrinsic 
fairness reducing the weight he assigns to their offers in determining 
his award. Farber (1981) shows that such a model will lead the parties 
to endogenously select their offers in an attempt to influence the arbi-
trator's decision and that, in equilibrium, the offers will be structured 
so that it appears that the arbitrator is "splitting the difference". 
Evidence that arbitrators are splitting the difference thus may imply 
only that expectations of arbitrators' decisions influence the parties' 
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Finally, Farber (1980a)(1980b) models final offer arbitration (FOA) 
as well as conventional arbitration. Under FOA a party has incentives to 
make concessions because, although such concessions reduce a party's 
expected utility if its position is chosen, they increase the probability 
that the party's position will be chosen. Thus, just as they are under 
conventional arbitration, the parties' offers are endogenous under FOA 
(Farber (1981)). As such, Farber shows that it is not necessarily the case 
that FOA will lead to more uncertainty about the arbitrator's decision, and 
thus one cannot conclude that FOA provides the parties with more of an incen-
tive to settle on their own than does conventional arbitration. Moreover, he 
also shows (1980b) that if the arbitrator awards the final offer closest 
to his notion of a fair settlement and the parties choose their final 
offers to maximize their expected utility, then the contract zone will be 
skewed against the more risk averse party. Put another way, the more risk 
averse party will win a greater share of the arbitrated awards but the 
awards it wins will be closer to the arbitrator's notion of intrinsic 
fairness than will the awards that the other party wins. Hence, evidence 
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that one party (e.g., unions) win most of the cases that go to arbitration 
may imply only greater risk aversion on that party's part, not that 
arbitrators are systematically biased in favor of that party. 
This series of papers illustrates how simple economic models can be 
used to contrast alternative institutional arrangements and to call into 
question the criteria by which industrial relations specialists evaluate 
the effectiveness of public sector impasse procedures. However, lest we 
appear too sanguine about the papers' importance, we should note that they 
have been subject to a number of criticisms. Crawford (1981) stresses 
that there is no theoretical justification for the key assumption that 
the size of the contract zone is positively related to the probability of 
reaching a negotiated settlement. To see this, suppose that there is 
only one point on the contract zone—only one bargaining outcome that 
both parties consider preferable to an arbitrated solution. Surely it 
should be easier for the parties to agree on that point than it would be 
for them to agree on one point out of five hundred on a contract zone, which 
all differed in their distribution of the pie between the parties. 
Without the assumption of the positive correlation between the size of the 
contract zone and the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement, 
many of the model's results concerning dependence on impasse procedures 
vanish. 
Similarly, an important assumption in a number of the models is 
that the "bargaining power" of each party is fixed, in the sense that a 
negotiated settlement would give each bargainer a fixed proportion of the 
difference between the two end points of the contract zone. This assump-
tion leads to the result that settlements will be skewed against the more 
risk averse party under both conventional and final offer arbitration. 
44 
However, Crawford (1981) challenges the idea that it is meaningful to talk 
about bargaining power independently of the parties' risk aversion; more 
risk averse parties surely have less bargaining power. Moreover, Bloom 
(1981a) raises the possibility that uncertainty will be present about the 
nature of negotiated settlements and also generalizes the Farber-Katz 
(1979) model to allow for resource costs of both the negotiations and 
arbitration processes. One key result of Bloom's is that increased uncer-
tainty about where the negotiated settlement will wind up leads to early 
use of the arbitration process (given the existence of direct costs of 
the negotiations process). 
One should not, however, go too far in dismissing the usefulness 
of the Farber-Katz line of research. In recent work, Ashenfelter and 
Bloom (1983a)(1983b) have looked at data on police wage settlements under 
the first three years of a binding arbitration procedure in New 
Jersey. This procedure allows for conventional arbitration if the parties 
agree to it and otherwise mandates final offer arbitration. The raw data 
suggest that unions win over two-thirds of the final offer arbitration 
cases, that there is about a two to three percentage point spread between 
the typical union and employer final offers, and that the means of the 
conventional arbitration awards in each year are very close to the means 
of the union offers under final offer arbitration. These data are very 
suggestive (assuming that conventional arbitration awards are good measures 
of arbitrators* intrinsic notions of fair awards) of a Farber (1980a) 
view of the world in which the more risk averse party (the union) is posi-
tioning its offers closest to arbitrators' intrinsic views of fairness and 
thus winning the majority of the cases. 
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Ashenfelter and Bloom formally test whether this is occurring. They 
assume that an arbitrator has a normally distributed set of pre-
ferred settlements and chooses the party's offer which is closest to a 
random draw from this distribution. This leads directly to a simple probit 
model of which party's offer is chosen that can be estimated from data 
on the parties' final offers, the arbitrator's decision, and the variables 
that determine the expected value of the arbitrator's preferred decision 
(such as private wage settlements). From such a model one can infer the 
mean and variance of the distribution of arbitrators' preferences. 
They show that it is straightforward to extend the model to allow 
for the arbitrator's preferred award to be influenced by the parties' 
final offers, as suggested in Farber's models, and to test if arbitrators 
are unbiased in the sense that they weigh both parties' offers equally in 
arriving at their preferred award. Finally, from conventional arbitration 
awards they show that one can again estimate the determinants of arbi-
trators' preferred settlements and see if these are the same under con-
ventional and final offer arbitration. Without going into the details of 
their work, suffice it to say that strong support is found for the 
underlying framework. 
Turning to the literature on strike activity in the public sector, 
it suffers, as does its private sector counterpart (see the chapter by 
John Keenan in this volume), from the lack of any single analytical model 
that is universally accepted as providing an explanation of strike 
activity. Although many public sector studies draw on existing theories 
of bargaining and strike activity, such as those found in Hicks (1966) 
and Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), for our purposes it is best to think 
of them as quasi-experimental designs in which some measure of strike 
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activity is regressed on a set of variables designed to capture the 
effects of public policy in an area, and a set of variables included to 
"control" for other factors. That is, the studies in the main seek to 
estimate the effects of public policies on the level of public sector 
strike activity. 
One early study, Thornton and Weintraub (1974), examined the level 
of strike activity in the twelve-month periods before and after the 
adoption of "permissive" public sector bargaining legislation for teachers 
in twenty-seven states, concluding that the level of strike activity 
tended to increase after the adoption of a statute. No conclusions can 
be drawn as to the casual nature of the relationship, since they failed 
to control for any other factors that may have influenced both the pro-
pensity of public employees to strike and the passage of a state law. 
A second paper of theirs, Weintraub and Thornton (1976) tried to improve 
upon the methodology, using aggregate time series data on various dimensions 
of teachers' strike activity (number of strikes, number of teachers involved, 
man-days idle, duration) over the 1946-73 period. These were speci-
fied to be a function of the percentage of school districts in states with 
permissive bargaining legislation and a vector of control variables. 
While the bargaining legislation variable tended to be positively associated 
with the various strike measures, it also tended to move like a time 
trend over the 1960-73 period; this makes it difficult to separate out its 
effects from those of changes in any other variables (e.g., teacher 
militancy). 
A second set of studies uses cross-section or pooled cross-section 
time-series data at the state level and focuses on more aspects of 
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state bargaining laws. Burton and Krider (1975) used data on four dimen-
sions of local government non-teacher strikes (strikes per employee, 
striking employees per employee, man-days idle per employee, and duration 
of strikes) for the 1968-71 period and regressed these outcomes on a 
vector of control variables, as well as a vector of public sector bargain-
ing law characteristics. The latter included dichotomous variables for 
the existence of a permissive bargaining law, the requirement that the 
parties meet and confer, the requirement that the parties bargain in good 
faith, the existence of third-party impasse procedures, and the existence 
of laws penalizing strikers. The authors found no consistent pattern of 
significant effects for any aspects of the laws, either in individual 
year cross-section or in the pooled data, and noted the low explanatory 
power of their models. The latter result is a characteristic of virtually 
all studies of public employee strikes. 
Subsequent studies using state-level data have followed in the Burton 
and Krider (1975) tradition. Perry (1977) used 1973 data for teachers, 
other local government employees (excluding police and firefighters), and 
state government employees and concluded that permissive strike policies 
tended to increase the frequency of teacher strikes. Rogers (1980) used 
data on all local government employees (including teachers) for 1974 and 
1975 and concluded that "meet and confer" laws were associated with a greater 
frequency of strike activity and that laws that made bargaining illegal 
and those that provided for third-party impasse procedures were associated 
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with a lower frequency. Finally, Partridge (1983) sought to replicate 
the Bruton and Krider analyses using data for all nonuniformed noneduca-
tional employees for the 1974-78 period. For the most part his results 
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were consistent with Burton and Krider's (no significant associations), 
although he did find that limited right-to-strike provisions were posi-
tively associated with strike frequency. 
The usefulness of these interstate studies is limited by their 
treatment of state statutes governing bargaining as exogenously determined, 
by the collinearity of various provisions of the laws which makes it diffi-
cult to disentangle their independent effects, and by the fact that the 
unit of observation does not correspond to the bargaining unit which makes 
it difficult to control for other forces that might influence the level of 
strike activity. Several recent studies use data on individual bargaining 
units and go at least part of the way towards resolving these difficulties. 
Olson, et al. (1981) used data on teachers, nonuniformed municipal 
employees, and police and firefighter negotiations in a number of states 
in 1975 and 1976. Logit probability of a strike occurring equations were 
estimated separately for each employee group, with an arbitration dummy 
variable included in the police and firefighter equations and a state 
dummy variable in the other equations to control for state public policies. 
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients suggested that in states 
where strike penalties were harsh and frequently enforced the frequency of 
strikes was lower, as it was for police and firefighters in states with 
an arbitration statute. While this study treated state laws as exogenous, 
Ichniowski (1982b) used data from 863 municipalities in 13 states for a 
number of years on police work stoppages and estimated a fixed effects 
model to control for the endogeneity of statutes. His results suggest 
that a change from no law to a "duty to bargain" law increased strike 
activity, while a shift from the latter to a compulsory arbitration statute 
decreased strike frequency. 
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A final study that utilized bargaining unit data has moved the 
analyses away from estimating the effects of state statutes back towards 
understanding the economic determinants of strikes. Olsen (1983) argues 
that most theories of strike activity imply that higher costs to the 
parties of strikes will lead to a lower level of strike activity. In the 
case of teachers, these costs will be inversely related to the probability 
that a school district will opt to reschedule school days lost during a 
strike. He models the latter as a function of the community's demand 
for education and the penalties imposed by the state if the length of the 
school year falls below a mandated state minimum. 
Using data on all school districts in Pennsylvania over a four-year 
period, a two-equation bivariate probit model was estimated that simul-
taneously determined the probabilities that lost school days will be 
rescheduled and that a strike will occur. The latter was specified to be 
a function of whether strike days were rescheduled in the past (if a strike 
occurred) and their probability of being rescheduled in the current round. 
His preliminary findings suggested that both of these variables positively 
influenced the probability of observing a strike. 
Turning next to the studies of the usage of third-party impasse pro-
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cedures, these have been of three types. The first addresses the issue 
of the "chilling" effects of arbitration statutes, asking how the statutes 
influence the amount of bargaining that occurs. A number of studies 
have analyzed a modified final offer arbitration statute introduced in 
Iowa in the mid 1970s. This statute replaced a prior system that had 
factfinding as the terminal stage in the procedure and it permits the arbi-
trator to choose as the final award either of the parties' offers or the 
recommendation made by a factfinder. Gallagher and Pegnetter (1979) found 
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the number of issues taken to impasse declined and Gallagher and Cahubey 
(1982) found the parties' willingness to compromise once at impasse 
increased after this statute was introduced. Similarly, Gallagher, Feuille, 
and Chaubey (1979) found that if a factfinder's report was issued, the 
parties tended to take fewer issues to arbitration and to compromise more 
on those issues prior to arbitration; a not unexpected result if one inter-
prets the factfinder's report as an estimate of what the arbitrator will 
consider to be an intrinsically fair solution, which reduces the parties' 
uncertainty about this parameter (Farber (1980)). 
Other studies used data from several states. Feuille (1975) studied 
the introduction of arbitration statutes in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin, found that the states with final offer arbitration had 
fewer issues in each case taken to impasse than did the states with 
conventional arbitration, and concluded that conventional arbitration 
had more of a chilling effect on bargaining. In contrast, Wheeler (1978) 
looked at the gap between the parties' final offers in states with and 
without arbitration statutes and found the parties' range of disagree-
ment was smaller in states with arbitration. 
Each of these studies used a very simple quasi-experimental design 
— a before-after comparison or a comparison of differences across bar-
gaining units—without any attempt to control for factors other than 
differences in the laws that might cause the outcomes to differ over time 
or across units. The same criticism can be directed at the second type 
of study; those which address the issue of the chilling effect by looking 
at variations in the frequency of impasse over time and across areas. 
Somers (1977) and Lipsky, Barocci, and Svojanen (1977) for Massachusetts, 
Kochan, et al. (1978) for New York State, and Olsen (1978) for Wisconsin, 
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all found that the percentage of police and firefighter negotiations 
going to impasse increased after the passage of arbitration statutes. 
Similarly, Lipsky and Drotning (1977) found the shift from legislative 
determination to factfinding as the final stage of the impasse procedure 
for teachers in New York State was associated with an increased percentage 
of negotiations going to impasse. Finally, Wheeler (1975b) conducted an 
interstate analysis of the percentage of firefighter negotiations going 
to impasse and found it to be higher in states with arbitration statutes 
than in states where the procedures terminated with factfinding. 
The third type of study addresses whether the procedures create a 
narcotic effect—a tendency once the parties use a procedure for them to 
become increasingly reliant upon it in future negotiations. The methodological 
approach used in these studies is somewhat more satisfactory than those 
used in the studies cited above. Equations of the form 
(3) Y.t = X.tB + G Y ^ + e ± t 
were estimated where Y (^  _.) takes on the value of one if bargaining 
unit i goes to impasse in period t (t-1), X is a set of economic, 
political, structural and organizational variables expected to influence 
the probability that unit i goes to impasse in period t, B is a 
vector of regression coefficients and e. is a random error term. A 
positive estimate for the coefficient 0 would suggest that prior impasse 
experience positively influences the probability of going to impasse in 
the current round. 
Estimates of variants of equation (3) are found in Kochan and 
Baderschneider (1978) for police and firefighters in New York, Olson (1978) 
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for the same groups in Wisconsin, and Lipsky and Drotning (1977) for 
teachers in New York. All found evidence that 0 is positive, which 
they interpret as implying that prior impasse experience has a narcotic 
effect. But does it really mean this? 
The problem here is one of distinguishing between a true narcotic 
effect and unobservable heterogeneity across bargaining units. If any 
unobservable variables that influence the probability of going to impasse 
exist and remain roughly constant over time, estimates of 0 will be 
biased in a positive direction. Butler and Ehrenberg (1981) show how one 
can correct for this bias using either a fixed or random effects model, 
along with an instrumental variable approach. Indeed, when they reanalyzed 
the Kochan-Baderschneider data using these methods, the estimates of 0 
they obtained proved to be negative—suggesting that a negative narcotic 
effect was present. That is, once unobservable heterogeneity was con-
trolled for, the experience of going to impasse in the past appeared to 
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reduce the probability of going to impasse in the current round. 
Studies of the effects of impasse procedures have focused on whether 
unions or management tends to win under arbitration, what the effects of 
the use of the procedures are on economic outcomes, and what the effects 
of the availability of the procedures per se are on economic outcomes. In 
the first group are studies by Ashenfelter and Bloom (1983a)(1983b) for New 
Jersey and Somers (1977) for Massachusetts that indicated that unions won 
over 60 percent of police and firefighter cases under final offer arbitra-
tion in the early years of the statutes. As we have previously discussed, 
Ashenfelter and Bloom have emphasized (following Farber (1980b)) that such 
a finding does not imply that arbitrators are biased in favor of unions. 
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Some of the studies of the effects of the use of impasse procedures 
have simply contrasted the mean wage levels or wage changes in a state of 
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units that settle at different stages of the process. Others have esti-
mated wage level or wage change equations across bargaining units in a 
state, including a set of explanatory variables to control for other forces 
that might be expected to influence wages. The consensus of these 
studies seems to be that the usage of arbitration per se, or the stage of 
the impasse procedure one settles at if an impasse is reached (mediation, 
factfinding, or arbitration), has no effect on wage levels or wage changes; 
the former result is not consistent with the Farber-Katz (1979) model. In 
contrast, in areas where strikes are at least de facto legal, there is some 
evidence that settlements arrived at in negotiations that do wind up in a 
strike are higher than those arrived at when the parties settle, without 
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reaching an impasse. 
Many of the studies of the effects of the availability of different 
forms of impasse procedures have used national samples (either at the 
individual or bargaining unit level) and estimated wage equations that 
included dummy variables for the form of impasse procedure present. 
Others have estimated wage level or wage change equations across bargain-
ing units within a single state, including a number of years' data and 
to 
dummy variables for years after a (new) impasse procedure was in place. 
While the latter suggest that the presence of an arbitration statute does 
not affect wages, the former strongly suggest that the availability of a 
statute increases wage levels by some 6 to 10 percent. Similarly, the 
availability of a strike option, also seems to be associated with higher 
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wages. 
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One must interpret these results with caution, however. The studies 
of the availability of the various procedures have not included data on 
actual use; it is therefore difficult to disentangle the effect of avail-
ability from that of use. More importantly, virtually all of the studies 
treat both the use of impasse procedures and their availability as £ 
exogenous. The former treatment seems strange in light of the work of 
Kochan and BaderSchneider (1978) and others described above, that model 
the usage of impasse procedures. The latter seems equally strange since 
the types of impasse procedures that exist are not randomly distributed 
across states. For example, arbitration statutes seem to have been enacted 
first in states where public sector unions are strong and where one might 
expect to observe above average wages even in the absence of the statutes. 
It is not surprising then, that the national cross-section "availability" 
studies show arbitration and/or the right to strike statutes having a 
positive effect on wages. Before these results can be taken at face value, 
the endogeneity of the availability and use of impasse procedures must be 
addressed. 
Finally, to reiterate a point made first in Section II, the availa-
bility studies focus on only one aspect of the legal environment governing 
public sector bargaining in a state. The effects of the "availability" 
of impasse procedures more appropriately should be estimated in the context 
of a model that permits consideration of other aspects such as budget 
referenda requirements, expenditure and tax limitation legislation, agency 
shop provisions, and constitutional requirements for balanced budgets. 
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VII. Public/Private Pay Comparisons 
As noted in the introduction, the pay of most federal white- and 
blue-collar workers in the United States is determined through a com-
parability process that ties their wages to the results of a government 
surveys of "comparable private employees," subject to possible Presi-
dential and Congressional modification. Other federal workers, for 
example postal workers, have their wages determined via collective bar-
gaining, as do many state and local government employees. However, again 
as noted above, the dispute resolution procedures which govern collective 
bargaining in the public and private sectors differs substantially between 
sectors. 
Given these differences between the public and private sector, many 
researchers have sought to ascertain whether comparably qualified workers 
performing comparable work in the public and private sector actually 
receive equal total compensation. That is, do the variety of institutional 
arrangements for determining wages that exist result in a compensation 
structure in which public employees are doing no better (or no worse) than 
they would if they were employed in the private sector? Even in the case 
of federal workers covered by the comparability surveys this question is 
difficult to answer because the comparability studies historically focused 
only on wages and ignored both nonwage benefits and nonpecuniary forms of 
compensation. Moreover, the jobs performed in the public and private 
sectors are not always directly comparable and subjective decisions must 
often be made as to how a job should be classified. 
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As a result, instead of focusing on the earnings of workers with 
comparable job characteristics, researchers have focused on the earnings of 
workers with comparable measured personal characteristics in the two sectors. 
The basic methodological approach, which is discussed most fully in Sharon 
Smith (1977a), is identical to that used in studies of sex, race, or union 
wage differentials. Equations of the form 
(4) Y. = £ a.X.. + a ..d. +
 Ej i j = 1 J ]i n+1 l i 
are estimated over a sample of public and private sector workers, where Y. 
is some measure of the natural logarithm of earnings, the X's are a 
vector of personal characteristics expected to influence earnings, d. 
is a dichotomous variable which takes on the value of one if the individual 
is a public employee and zero otherwise, and e. is a random error. 
Estimates of the parameter a , provide information on the public/ 
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private earnings differential. In practice, a vector of dummy variables 
is often used to indicate the level of government at which the individual 
is employed (federal, state, or local), separate estimates are obtained 
by race or sex, and/or separate earnings equations estimated for public 
and private employees. In the latter case, one can estimate the public/ 
private differentials by the wage differentials that would exist if govern-
ment employees with a given set of characteristics were paid according to 
the private wage equation, or by the differentials that would exist if 
private employees with such characteristics were paid according to 
the government wage equation. 
The major work in this area has been done by Sharon Smith in a 
series of articles and books; our summary of the estimates obtained by 
her and several other researchers for selected years between 1960 and 
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1978 appears in Table 4. The studies are not all directly comparable for a number 
of reasons. Some use annual earnings as the measure of earnings, others 
use hourly earnings. The variables included in the vector X vary across 
studies; for example only about a half of the studies include a measure 
of unionization. The definition of who is a public employee, especially 
at the state and local level also varies across studies. Finally, the 
private sector comparison group varies across studies; in most it is all 
private nonagricultural workers, but in the Wachter and Perloff (1981) 
study, it is taken to be private sector employees employed in service 
industries. 
Despite these differences, these studies paint a fairly uniform 
picture. The federal/private sector differential is positive but has 
appeared to diminish during the 1970s from over 20 to under 15 percent. 
Postal workers, whose salaries are determined via collective bargaining, 
receive earnings differentials relative to private sector workers, that 
are about equal to the differentials received by other federal workers. 
The federal/private differentials appear to be larger for females than 
for males and for nonwhite males than for white males; this may reflect 
a lesser level of race and gender discrimination in the federal than in 
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A similar result occurs in both the state and local sectors, where 
again, public/private earnings differentials are larger for females than 
for males. Moreover, as we move from the federal, to the state, to the 
local government level, the size of the government/private earnings 
differential gets smaller. Indeed, after controlling for personal charac-
teristics, on average males employed by local governments, and possibly also 
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males employed by state governments earn less than their private sector 
,
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counterparts. 
What factors cause the public/private earnings differentials to 
decline as we move from the federal to the state to the local level? 
One possibility is that taxpayer information about the effect of public 
employee wage increases on tax burdens is much easier to obtain and 
understand the smaller is the level of government. It may also be easier 
to hold local politicians accountable for such financial decisions; each 
federal legislator is just one out of hundreds of representatives who 
vote on scores of issues besides government employee pay. As such, 
pressure to hold down public-employee wage scales may be greater at the 
state and local than at the federal level. 
A serious deficiency with most of these studies, which is often 
acknowledged by the authors, is that they tend to focus on measures of 
earnings or wages, rather than on total compensation. The latter should 
include all present and expected future forms of pecuniary (e.g., fringe 
benefits) and nonpecuniary (e.g., working conditions and stability of 
employment) conditions of employment. Presumably, if labor markets were 
fully competitive, one would observe equality of total compensation, as 
defined above, across sectors, not equality of current earnings. 
Some limited research has been conducted that does focus on outcomes 
other than earnings levels. For example, several authors have tried to 
examine various components of fringe benefits. Bellante and Long (1981) 
and Quinn (1979b) use an estimate of fringes as a percentage of wages, 
and Quinn (1982) uses an estimate of pension wealth, and all find that 
fringe benefits in the public sector tend to exceed those in the private 
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sector, with the difference being greatest for federal workers (one must 
be cautious in interpreting these results though, since some aspects of 
fringes are difficult to quantify and/or value). Similarly, Quinn (1977) 
uses survey data on disamenities of the workplace (pace of work, degree 
of supervision, danger, etc.) and finds that, ceteris paribus, private 
sector workers tend to be employed in situations with more disamenities 
than do public employees. These results suggest that positive public/ 
private wage differentials are not compensating differentials for either 
lower fringe benefits or unfavorable working conditions. 
Other authors have examined the question of stability of employment. 
Sharon Smith in a number of her studies (e.g., Smith (1976b)) uses both 
hourly and annual earnings as dependent variables to control for annual 
variations in hours of work. Bloch and Smith (1979) also directly examine 
the probability that an individual will be employed at a point in time, 
and find that it is higher for white male federal employees and for all 
race/sex groups of state and local government employees than it is for 
comparable private sector workers. Hence again, positive public/private 
wage differentials are apparently not compensating differentials for 
relative instability of employment in the public sector. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there have been relatively few attempts to 
explain why public/private earnings differentials vary over time and 
across regions and states; the geographic variation has been noted by Smith in 
a number of her papers and by Borjas (1982b). A notable exception is 
Borjas (1982a) who presents and tests a theory of why federal/private 
wage differentials should vary over the electoral cycle and Borjas (1982b) 
who presents and tests a political model of a vote-maximizing bureaucrat 
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to explain why state government/private differentials should vary across 
- .
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states. 
Neither of these studies, however, explicitly considers the role of 
institutional variables. To return to a previous theme, we are offered 
no insights about the effects of state laws such as those governing 
public sector impasse procedures, those establishing tax or expenditure 
limitations, or those governing public sector union security arrangements, 
on public/private pay differentials. Save for studies of postal workers, 
there have also been no studies of federal/private net wage differentials 
for federal workers whose wages are determined via collective bargaining; 
we have little evidence then about whether the comparability process leads 
to larger, or smaller, relative wage differentials than one would observe 
under collective bargaining. 
All of the studies of public/private wage differentials have treated 
individuals' sectors of employment as exogenous. However, if individuals 
nonrandomly sort themselves into public or private jobs because of dif-
ferences in tastes for public service or preferences for nonrisky employ-
ment, then the possibility of sample section bias arises. In fact, 
evidence presented by Bellante and Link (1981) suggest that public sector 
workers are more risk averse than private sector workers and that, holding 
risk aversion constant, many of the same factors that influence wages in 
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the public and private sector also influence the sector of employment. 
In view of all of the conceptual and measurement problems involved 
with trying to estimate public/private pay comparability, a number of 
investigators have suggested simply focusing on quit rates instead 
(e.g., Adie (1977)). Since, holding constant characteristics of individuals, 
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better pecuniary and nonpecuniary conditions of employment should lead to 
lower quit rates, the argument is that public/private quit rate differen-
tials would be prima facie evidence of public/private total compensation 
differentials. The evidence on quit rates seems compelling; both gross 
quit rates (e.g., Adie (1977), Wachter and Perloff (1981)) and net quit 
rates after controlling for personal characteristics (e.g., Long (1982)) 
are lower in the public than in the private sector. 
A problem with these studies, however, is that they contain no 
controls for characteristics of jobs. One key variable is the size of 
the employer for, ceteris paribus, the larger the employer, the more 
likely that an unhappy employee can improve his lot by an intrafirm 
change. Put another way, quits should be negatively related to firm 
size (Utgoff (1981)). Since federal and state governments and some local 
governments are obviously large employers, their lower quit rates may at 
least partially be due to this fact. 
A second key characteristic is the amount of specific training required 
for a particular job. As is well known, in situations where specific 
training is involved, an employer's goal is to minimize the sum of hiring, 
training and compensation costs, not simply compensation costs. A high-
wage low-quit policy may contribute to the former objective. Thus, one 
can not simply focus on relative compensation or quit levels in judging 
comparability; one needs to know the savings in hiring and training costs 
from pursuing a high-wage policy. Although many researchers have looked 
at publie/private quit and wage differentials, only Adie (1977) has 
examined (for postal workers) if the differentials could be possibly 
"justified" by lower hiring and training costs. 
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VIII. Discrimination in Public Sector Labor Markets 
The studies of public/private wage comparisons discussed in the pre-
vious section suggest that public/private wage ratios are higher for 
females than for males and for nonwhites than for whites (see Table 4). 
This may reflect a lesser extent of gender and race discrimination in 
public sector labor markets; a result that would not be totally unexpected 
for two reasons. First the highly structured nature of federal, state, 
and local government employment with civil service and/or collectively 
bargained work rules, often requires equal pay for all individuals with 
the same seniority and qualifications who are employed in a given job. 
Thus, discrimination can take primarily the form of slower promotion rates or 
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unequal access to initial jobs, not of unequal pay for equal work. Second, 
the oldest U.S. programs to combat race discrimination in employment are 
equal employment opportunity programs for government employees. The 
federal programs started during the New Deal and, by 1945, thirteen states 
had similar provisions for their employees—predating the Civil Rights Act 
by some twenty years. If these programs had any "teeth", one would 
expect to observe less race discrimination in the public sector. 
A number of researchers have focused on estimating the extent of 
race or gender discrimination in the public sector and their methodologies 
are by now fairly standard. Returning to equation (4) of the previous 
section, let the sample now refer to white federal employees, let d now 
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be a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of one if the individual 
is a male and zero if the individual is a female, and let all other 
variables be defined as before. Estimates of the parameter a . now 
provide information on the male/female earnings differential that exists 
for whites employed in the federal sector, after one controls for the other 
variables in the analysis. 
One can similarly do analyses of gender differentials for nonwhites 
employed in the federal sector, and for employees of state and local 
governments. By restricting the sample to employees of one gender and 
letting d. stratify employees by race, one can obtain estimates of white/ 
nonwhite earnings differentials for public employees. Finally, rather 
than inserting a dichotomous variable in (4), one can again estimate 
separate equations by gender (or race). In this case, the male/female 
(white/nonwhite) government employee earnings differential is estimated 
by the differential that would exist if female (nonwhite) government 
employees with a given set of characteristics were paid according to the 
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male (white) wage equation. 
Studies that have utilized such approaches with various micro-
data files suggest that, after controlling for personal characteristics 
of workers, the earnings of minorities and females employed in the govern-
ment sector are often substantially lower than those of white males— 
although the magnitude of the differences may be slightly less than com-
parable gender and race differences in earnings found in the private 
sector. For example, Corazzini (1972) studied black federal employees in 
the Washington, D.C. area and found they earned approximately $1,700 less 
than their white counterparts, primarily due to slower rates of promotion. 
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Long (1976) used data from the 1970 Census and found adjusted black/white 
earnings ratios in the federal sector of roughly .76 for males and .74 for 
females; the former is about the size of the private sector ratio while 
the latter is considerably larger, implying that less gender discrimina-
tion occurs in the federal than in the private sector. Borjas (1978) used 
data collected by the Civil Service Commission for employees of the then 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1977 and again found females 
and nonwhites paid significantly less than white males with identical 
personal characteristics; results that he found to hold true for federal 
employees in general in a later paper (Borjas (1983)). 
As in the case of public/private pay comparisons, perhaps the most 
comprehensive study to date is S. Smith (1977a) who analyzed gender and race 
differentials in public employees' earnings at different levels of govern-
ment. Some of her results, obtained using 1973 and 1975 Census of Popula-
tion data,are summarized in Table 5. They confirm that, ceteris paribus, 
males appeared to get paid more than females and whites more than blacks at 
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all levels of government. However, the race and gender differentials she 
found were smaller at the state and local government level than they were at 
the federal level. Indeed, Antos and Rosen (1975), who confined their 
analyses to local government public school teachers, found virtually no 
evidence of gender differentials and only little evidence of race 
differentials. 
To the extent that the male/female and white/nonwhite earnings dif-
ferentials one observes in the federal sector can be interpreted as 
estimates of labor market discrimination, one must conclude that the federal 
government EEO programs directed at its own employees have not been 
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completely effective. However, this does not imply that federal govern-
ment employment per se has not reduced the extent of labor market dis-
crimination in the economy. These studies suggest that gender and race 
differentials are smaller in the public sector and the studies summarized 
in the last section imply, ceteris paribus, that federal government 
employees earn more than private employees with comparable characteristics. 
As such, if the probabilities that females or nonwhites obtain employment 
in the federal sector exceed the comparable probabilities for males or 
whites, the presence of government employment will cause the average female 
(nonwhite) wage in the economy to rise relative to the average male (white) 
wage. D. Alton Smith (1980) demonstrates that this condition appears to 
have been met. 
In a recent article, Borjas (1982c) has moved the discussion away 
from measuring the existence of gender and race earnings differentials in 
government per se to a discussion of discrimination in different federal 
government agencies. It is well known that both the fraction of an agency's 
employees who are minorities and the fraction of these minority employees 
who are in upper-level jobs varies widely across agencies. For example, 
in 1978 both fractions were low in the Defense Department and high in the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Similar observations can be made 
for female employees who in 1978 were underrepresented at Defense but over-
represented at the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
After providing evidence that the magnitudes of gender and race earnings 
differentials also vary across agencies (Borjas (1982c) (1983)), Borjas 
seeks to provide an explanation for why this might occur. 
Based on previous work (Borjas (1980a) (1980b), he presents a model 
of a government trying to maximize its political support. The constituency 
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of each government agency is assumed to have a "taste" for discrimination 
and he shows that the vote maximization hypothesis predicts that the 
economic status of minorities (females) in an agency will depend upon how 
important minorities (females) are in generating political support for 
the agency. Operationally, the race (gender) composition of an agency's 
constituents is measured by the race (gender) composition of employment 
in the industry the agency "relates to" and/or the race (gender) composi-
tion of the population in states where the agency expends funds. The 
expenditures made by an agency on civil rights activities is also used 
as a measure of its affirmative action orientation. His empirical work, 
which uses individual personnel data from the Office of Personnel 
Management, does indeed lead to the conclusion that a portion of the 
interagency variation in race and gender earnings differentials can be 
explained by interagency variations in the above variables. 
Finally two recent studies have sought to ascertain whether specific 
federal programs relating to public sector labor markets have significantly 
reduced gender discrimination. Simeral (1978) estimated wage equations for 
a sample of participants who held Public Service Employment (PSE) program 
jobs that were created under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. She 
estimated separate wage equations for participants' pre-program, PSE, and 
post-program jobs and computed male/female wage differentials from each. 
These differentials actually rose over time; hence she concluded that the 
PSE program did not lead to less gender discrimination. 
Eberts and Stone (1982) focused on gender differences in promotions 
of public school teachers to administrative positions in New York and 
Oregon. They sought to analyze the effects of Title IX legislation, that 
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was passed in 1972 and enforced through guidelines starting in 1975, 
which prohibited gender discrimination against students and employees 
in public schools. Using longitudinal data on teachers in both states 
they estimated logit probability of promotion equations for periods prior 
to and after the legislation, finding that gender differentials in pro-
motion rates to administrative positions tended to decline after the 
legislation. While they concluded that the legislation probably had an 
impact on females' promotion rates, one must caution that their approach 
did not permit them to disentangle the effects of the law from the 
effects of any other "macro-level" variables that changed at the same 
time. In particular since the decade of the 70's saw an ever increasing 
movement of women out of traditional female occupations, such as teaching, 
one might question whether higher female promotion rates to administrative 
positions would have occurred even in the absence of the law. 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
A long summary of the literature requires no summary. However, 
several themes have emerged from our review that are worth repeating. 
First, one unique aspect of public sector labor markets is that the 
laws governing impasse resolution vary across states. This provides an 
opportunity for researchers to estimate their effects on union/nonunion 
wage (and nonwage) differentials, on wage levels, on the demand for labor, 
and on public/private pay differentials. However, other aspects of the 
legal environment that influence bargaining also differ across states; 
these include budget referenda requirements, expenditure and/or tax limi-
tation legislation, balanced budget requirements, and agency shop provisions. 
Studies are required that consider all of these forces simultaneously and 
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that allow for the possibility that many of them are endogenously 
determined. 
A second unique aspect is that the unit of observation in public 
sector studies tends often to be a bargaining unit (e.g., a city or school 
district), and the underlying union contracts in areas where bargaining 
takes place are typically available to researchers. As such, in contrast to 
private sector studies that have focused on estimating union/nonunion 
productivity differentials, there is much more room in the public sector 
for studies of how specific contract provisions influence resource alloca-
tion decisions and productivity. One must stress here, though, both the 
need to model the determinants of contract provisions and the fact that 
unionization per se may influence productivity independently of specific 
contract provisions. 
Third, studies of the tradeoffs between wage and nonwage conditions 
of employment in the public sector suffer from the same two methodological 
problems that virtually all private sector compensating wage differential 
studies suffer from (but rarely admit). On the one hand, these studies 
typically try to estimate the tradeoff between wages and one set of non-
wage characteristics, for example fringes (working conditions), but omit 
other job characteristics, for example working conditions (fringes) from 
the analysis. On the other hand, their estimation methods typically 
treat the nonwage characteristics as predetermined. While in some cases 
neither one of these restrictions will cause problems, often econometric 
problems arise that only a few researchers have confronted (see Section 
VII). 
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Fourth, many of the studies of public sector labor markets make no 
mention of the role of unions. For example, while there are private sector 
studies that examine whether unions affect the demand for labor or the 
existence of compensating wage differentials for unfavorable job charac-
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teristics, virtually no public sector counterparts exist. Clearly, 
there is room for research here. 
Finally, many of the empirical studies of arbitration statutes use 
criteria such as whether arbitrated settlements are the same as negotiated 
ones, or whether unions and management each win roughly half of the cases 
that go to impasse, to evaluate how the statute is performing. However, 
simple economic models of the arbitration process suggest that a priori 
neither of those outcomes is likely to occur. This suggests that the 
empirical studies may have focused on inappropriate criteria and it 
emphasizes the general proposition that the criteria used in evaluations 
of social policies should be based on explicit conceptual models. 
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Footnotes 
1. For an interesting analysis of the private not-for-profit or 
voluntary sector, see Burton Weisbrod (1977). 
2. John F. Burton, Jr. (1979), Table 3. After 1978 the data cease 
to be comparable, so we have terminated our comparisons as of this date. 
3. There were some major exceptions—namely, postal workers and 
employees of federal government authorities, such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA). In each of these cases the prices of the products or 
services produced (mail delivery, hydroelectric power) can be raised to 
cover the cost of the contract settlement, unlike other federal agencies 
where salaries are paid out of general revenues. 
4. See Sharon Smith (1977a) for a more complete description of the 
comparability process in the federal sector. 
5. See B. V. H. Schneider (1979) for a more complete discussion of 
the evolution of laws governing bargaining in the public sector. 
6. See H. Wellington and R. Winter (1969). 
7. For more details on dispute resolution in the public sector, see 
Thomas Kochan (1979) and John Burton (1981). 
8. The PSE was terminated, however, by the Reagan Administration in 
the early 1980s. 
9. For example, on the public/private pay comparability issue alone 
one could cite R. Layard, A. Matin, and A. Zabalza (1982) for Great 
Britain, and Morley Gunderson (1980) for Canada. 
10. See, for example, Martin Binkin and Irene Kyriakopoulos (1981) for 
a study of executive compensation in the federal sector. At the local govern-
ment level, Gerald Goldstein and Ronald Ehrenberg (1976) study whether the 
compensation of police chiefs, fire chiefs, and city managers is related 
to their "performance". 
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11. See, for example, Robert Hartman and Arnold Weber, eds. (1980). 
12. This section owes much to previous surveys of public sector union 
wage effects including Lipsky (1982), Mitchell (1979), and Flanagan and 
Mitchell (1982). 
13. The study using SMSA data is Cain, et al. (1981), while the 
studies using CPS data include Baugh and Stone (1982) and Moore and 
Raisian (1981). 
14. In spite of the dramatic growth of public sector collective bar-
gaining over the last 25 years, relatively few studies have been conducted 
on the determinants of the growth of public sector unionization over time 
or on why collective bargaining coverage in the sector varies across areas. 
This is surprising because the laws governing bargaining in the SLG sector 
differ across states and are continuously evolving. 
A number of studies have estimated probit union coverage, or existence 
of a union contract, equations using cross-section data in the context of 
models that seek to control for selection bias in union outcomes equations. 
For example, Cain, et al. (1981) used individual data from the CPS for 
hospital workers, finding that region of the country and size of city were 
the key explanatory variables. Bartel and Lewin (1981) used data from a 
1973 survey of police in about 200 cities with populations greater than 
25,000 and found that the percentage of private sector workers organized 
in an area was significantly associated with the probability of union 
coverage. Finally, Ehrenberg, Sherman and Schwarz (1983) used data on 
260 municipal libraries in cities over 50,000 in size in 1977 and found 
that the probability of observing a union was significantly related to the 
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laws in the state governing collective bargaining for municipal employees. 
In particular, a state law that prohibited strikes reduced the probability 
of observing a union, while a state law providing mediation or factfinding 
services in the event of an impasse, increased the probability. 
This latter study illustrated one type of natural experiment one can 
perform to analyze the effects of state laws on union coverage. A second 
type is found in Ichniowski (1982a) who used panel data, spanning the 1958-1978 
period for a set of almost 1,000 cities, on the existence of a written 
contract for police and estimated a logit model of the determinants of union 
contracts. Even after controlling for a time trend and a set of city-
specific variables, Ichniowski found that the number of years since a public 
sector bargaining law was passed in a state significantly was associated with 
the probability of observing a contract. Moreover, independent associations were 
found for several dimensions of the law—whether bargaining was permitted, 
whether bargaining was required, and whether an arbitration statute for 
police impasses existed. 
A final study, Moore (1978) sought to explain both aggregate time-
series (1919-1970) and interstate (1970) variation in teachers' unions 
membership. For some specifications of his cross-section work, he found 
that both the presence of a mandatory bargaining law and the proportion 
of private sector employees who were union members significantly associated 
with teacher union membership. 
One senses from these studies that state laws governing public sector 
bargaining are significantly associated with union membership and collective 
bargaining coverage. However, an unresolved issue is the direction of 
causation; no one has seriously studied whether public sector union strength 
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influences laws governing public sector bargaining. Room is clearly 
present here for more work, possibly involving Granger causality tests. 
15. Ichniowski (1980). 
16. In the case of the percentage unionization variable, the estimate 
should be interpreted as the relative wage differential between cities with 
some union members and those with none. We should note that Lewis (1983) 
has argued that the estimates obtained from macro level studies (studies 
that use grouped data) that use an extent of unionization variable should 
not be interpreted as wage gap estimates. His argument, however, seems to 
apply to the case when the units of observation are all in different 
industries. When they are in a single industry, as is the case for the 
public sector studies, one can show that the estimates can be interpreted 
as wage gap estimates (see Ashenfelter (1971), footnote 16) although they 
will not always be unbiased estimates. 
17. A notable exception, however, is Edwards and Edwards (1982a) who 
find larger union/nonunion wage differentials for solid waste collection 
employees in cities with public collection systems than in cities with 
private systems. 
18. Some people have also argued that the smaller estimated public 
sector union differentials may reflect the fragmented nature of bargaining 
in the public sector—with bargaining done often at the local level by 
"occupation." Since a similar bargaining structure exists in construction 
where union/nonunion differentials considerably exceed the private sector 
average differential, we are suspicious of this explanation. 
19. In fact one study, Rogers (1979), found that union/nonunion fringe 
benefit differentials were sometimes negative for certain categories of 
fringes, suggesting a willingness of unions to trade off some benefits for 
others. 
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20. Suppose initially that there are two types of employees, junior 
workers who get paid W. and senior workers who get paid (l+s)W. and 
that half of a city's workforce is in each category. Suppose also that a 
union increases wages of the two groups by a and am percent respectively, 
(m > 1) and the city responds by increasing the share of junior workers 
it hires to y(>h)- Then the union/nonunion average wage differential is 
[W (1+C0Y + W ( 1+s) (1+am) (l-y)]/[W (h)+ W.. (1+s) (Jg) ] or [(l+o)y + 
(1+s)(1+am)(1-Y)1/[1 + (s/2)]. This will be less than (l+a) provided that 
[(1+s) (1+am) (l-y)/(l+a)] < 1 + (-| - y) . For example, if s = 1 (initially 
senior workers get paid twice as much), a = .1 and m = 1.5, then any 
value of Y > .542 will yield the union/nonunion average wage differential 
to be less than the comparable minimum wage differential. 
21. To see this, suppose that there are two types of cities; low wage 
where public employees are paid W in the absence of unions and high 
wage where they are similarly paid hW (h > 1). Suppose initially that 
all of the former are nonunion and the fraction f of the latter are 
unionized and that unions increase their members' wages by a percent. 
If there are an equal number of high and low wage cities, the observed 
union/nonunion wage differential is given by 
fh(2-f) [(l+a)hWn]/[{(l-f)hWn + Wn)/(2-f)] or (l+a) ((l-f)h+lj 
It is straightforward to see that as f increases the observed differential 
increases. 
22. A number of studies have looked at whether union/nonunion wage 
differentials vary with characteristics of cities, such as city size. 
For example, Ehrenberg (1973) found annual salary differentials for fire-
fighteres that did not vary with city size. 
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23. For a good nontechnical treatment of the argument, see Freeman 
and Medoff (1979). 
24. The latter studies also attempted to ascertain if collective 
bargaining coverage affects the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor or the elasticities between different categories of labor in the 
production of library services. 
25. In work in progress, Linda Edwards is studying productivity in 
sanitation. 
26. Teachers' effectiveness was estimated via the estimation of 
educational production functions using individual student data, which 
permitted separate intercepts for each teacher in the sample. 
27. Winkler (1980) is an exception. 
28. Eberts and Stone (forthcoming) is an exception. 
29. The next few paragraphs drawn heavily from Smith and Ehrenberg 
(1979). For more details, see also Ehrenberg and Smith (1981). 
30. Gene Mumy (1978) treats underfunding as a temporary intergenera-
tional transfer and models why the level of underfunding should vary 
across retirement systems. 
31. Why underfunding may be viewed as permanent is discussed in Mumy 
(1983) and Inman (1981). The latter presents evidence that underfunding 
is not fully capitalized in the form of lower property values, which sug-
gests that politicians are able to at least partially "hide" the under-
funding from taxpayers. 
32. A model deriving the set of correlates is found in Ehrenberg 
(1980b). 
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33. R. Smith (1983) also found that state (as opposed to local) 
funding of pensions was associated with higher wages, the level of pensions 
held constant; a not unexpected result. 
34. For an elaboration of the functional form issue see R. Smith 
(1979). 
35. Eberts and Stone's paper goes beyond the compensating differen-
tial question and attempts to test if teachers' contracts are "efficient". 
36. For an elaboration of this point, see Smith and Ehrenberg 
(1983). 
37. The use of such "median voter" or "representative decision-maker" 
models goes back at least as far as Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967). Not 
all economists believe, however, that public sector decision-making can be 
effectively modeled in such a way. See, for example, Reder (1975) and 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) who postulate that bureaucrats seek to maximize 
their own welfare, not that of a median voter. 
38. The Stone-Geary utility function and the resulting linear 
expenditure system is described in Stone (1954). Its modification to allow 
for minimum required consumption levels to be functions of prior consump-
tion occurs in Pollack and Wales (1969). The system of employment demand 
equations actually estimated by Ehrenberg was 
t
 M t-1 
l°8(-f- " ^i—) =boj + bx. log w. + b2. log((B- j ^ V*k\t~1)/P) 
m 
+ E C log SD j = l,2,...n 
k=l R j r 
where M./P is per capita SLG employment in category j, a. is the 
minimum fraction of last period's employment in the category that must be 
employed this period, w. is a measure of the category's wage rate, B/P 
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is the per capita SLG employment budget, the SD are those sociodemographic 
variables expected to influence the demand for category j, there are n 
employment categories, and the b's and C's are parameters to be 
estimated. With this system, decisions are made about increments of 
employment above "committed" levels and only the total employment budget 
less "committed" expenditures is free to be allocated. To be consistent 
with the Stoney-Geary utility function b1. should equal minus one 
and b equal one for all j; a very severe restriction which was not 
imposed in the estimation. A separate equation was also fitted to explain 
the determinants of the per capita SLG employment budget. 
39. See Barten (1968) or Theil (1971). Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (AE) 
estimated the system of demand equations 
n n 
f.d In (M./P) = 1 n.,d lnw, + u. [ Z f.dln(M./P)] J"^"--n 
J 1
 k = 1 jk k J k = 1 k 1c k=l,...n 
where w. and M./P again represent the wage rate and per capita employ-
ment level of the j category of public employees and f. is the 
average share of category j in the total SLG employment budget. The 
equation is expressed in terms of the change, over time, in the natural 
logs of the variables and the expression in brackets on the right-hand 
side can be shown to be approximately equal to the change in the real per 
capita employment budget. The u. and II., are parameters to be estimated; 
J Jk 
the former is interpreted as the marginal budget share allocated to category 
j. It is straightforward to show that to satisfy the budget constraint the 
u. must sum to unity and that utility maximization implies that II., = II, , 
J jk kj 
(symmetry) and E II., = 0 (homogeneity). Thus, the restrictions imposed 
k Jfc 
by the utility maximization hypothesis can be tested directly. 
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Since this system is expressed in first difference form, any socio-
demographic variables that might affect only the intercept term of the 
demand equations drop out. However, to allow for the possibility that 
population density might affect other parameters in the model, separate 
estimates were provided by AE for high and low density states. 
40. For evidence on union effects on class size, see Hall and 
Carroll (1973). 
41. For a recent analytical treatment of this point, see Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979). They also provide evidence, based on a survey 
of a random sample of 2001 Michigan residents in 1978 that dealt with voters 
support for tax limitation legislation, that SLG employees appear to want 
more SLG spending than do private and federal employees (see Courant, Gramlich, 
and Rubinfeld (1980)), although the difference is not large. 
42. The only study we know that examined the effects of unions and 
form of government on the demand for municipal employees, was Ehrenberg 
(1973b) who looked at a sample of 90 cities in 1970-71 and found incon-
clusive results. 
43. If the "median voter" approach was correct, the passage of 
such legislation would only reflect changes in other forces influencing 
the demand for public services and should have no independent effect. 
If, in contrast, a "bureaucratic-maximization" approach is correct, 
passage of restrictions based on voters' preferences might affect public 
sector outcomes. Some evidence in favor of the bureaucratic model is 
found in Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982), however, they do not focus on 
public sector labor demand. 
44. A similar estimate is found in Perles (1983). Bassi (1981) up-
dates the cross-section analyses to FY 78 and 79 and finds results similar to 
those in Adams, e_t al. (1983) that are cited immediately below. 
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45. One should also stress that the net job creation effect of a 
PSE program is not the sole criteria one should use in evaluating it. 
Even if fiscal substitution is complete (no new SLG employees are hired 
directly with program funds), as long as the PSE funds are spent (or used 
to reduce taxes) they will have a generally stimulative effect on labor 
markets. In addition, one is also interested in questions like "Did it 
shift the composition of SLG employees toward groups at which the program 
was targetted?" or "Did it substantially increase the earnings of program 
participants, both during and subsequent to their program participation?" 
Answers to these questions have been provided by many; these studies are 
outside the scope of our survey. For some evidence on the latter point, 
see Bassi (1982). 
46. For example, in 1979 there were 593 work stoppages involving 
205,000 state and local government workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1981)). 
47. See Stevens (1966) for an early argument to this effect. 
48. This point has also been made by Kochan, et al. (1979) and 
Hirsch and Donn (1982). It is often thought that final offer arbitration 
would increase uncertainty due to the all or nothing decision of the 
arbitrator. However, Farber and Katz suggest that such a view ignores the 
endogeneity of the parties' final offers; a point developed more fully in 
Farber (1980a)(1980b). 
49. Farber (1981) also shows that the more weight the arbitrator 
puts on the parties' positions, the smaller the contract zone will be and 
thus the higher the probability of arbitrated settlements. 
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50. Crawford (1981) also questions the generalizability of these 
models when more than one outcome is being negotiated and raises the possi-
bility that the equilibriums that the models assume to exist will not always 
exist. For his own work, which considers bargaining over a number of out-
comes when arbitrators' decisions are assumed to be known with certainty, 
see Crawford (1979). 
51. By "permissive" legislation, we mean legislation that 
explicitly permitted collective bargaining for teachers. 
52. Nelson, Stone, and Swint (1981) is another aggregate time-series 
study, but the only public policy variable they included was a dummy 
variable for the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act. Since the latter 
applies only to private sector unions, its relevance to the public sector 
is not obvious. 
53. Wheeler (1975a) performed a simple comparison (without any 
controls) of firefighter strikes in states with arbitration statutes 
vis-a-vis those without such statutes and similarly found lower levels of 
strike activity in the former. 
54. Due to space limitations our discussion here is necessarily 
brief. For a survey of the empirical arbitration literature, see Anderson 
(1981). 
55. See Kochan and Baderschneider (1978) for a description of the 
variables that might enter into the vector X. Their effort to provide a 
behavioral model of the forces that determine whether negotiations go to 
impasse is an important one, which we shall return to below. 
56. The model is easily extended to allow impasses in rounds prior 
to t-1 to have an effect. Some of the researchers cited below have also 
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simply looked at aggregate statistics on whether the conditional proba-
bility of going to impasse depends on prior impasse experience. It should 
be evident that this is equivalent to estimating equation (3) without any 
X variables, so all of our criticisms of that approach given below are 
equally applicable to these efforts. 
57. Olson actually finds that if a union has won a prior arbitration 
hearing, the probability of going to arbitration in the current round 
increases. 
58. Explanations for why a negative narcotic effect might occur 
are found in Butler and Ehrenberg (1981). 
59. See for example, Gallagher, Feuille, and Chaubey (1979) who 
contrast outcomes under mediation, factfinding and final offer arbitration 
in Iowa, Subbarao(1979) who contrasts outcomes for Canadian federal sector 
workers who struck or who went to arbitration (Canadian law permits the 
choice of routes), Lipsky, Barocci, and Svojanen (1977) who contrasted 
outcomes at different stages of impasse resolution for Massachusetts police 
and firefighters, and Thompson and Cairnie (1973) who contrasted arbitrated 
and negotiated wage settlements for British Columbia school districts. 
60. See for example, Bloom (1981b) who contrasted negotiated, conven-
tionally arbitrated and final offer arbitrated settlements for police in 
New Jersey, Delaney (1983) who contrasted negotiated and arbitrated settle-
ments for teachers in Iowa and negotiated settlements with and without 
strikes for teachers in Illinois, and Anderson (1979) and Auld, Christofides 
and Wilton (1981) who studied Canadian federal sector employees. 
61. See Delaney (1983) and Subbara (1979). 
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62. For example, Olson (1980) used data for six years on 72 firefighter 
bargaining units and contrasted having an arbitration statute with not having 
one. Kochan and Wheeler (1975) similarly studied firefighters using data on 
121 bargaining units in 1972. Delaney and Feuille (1983) used bargaining 
unit data on police in 698 cities in 1980. Finally, Delaney (1983) used 
1979 Current Population Survey data on individual public school teachers. 
63. For example, Kochan, et al. (1978) contrasted arbitration and 
factfinding for police and firefighters in New York, Lipsky and Drotning 
contrasted factfinding and legislative determination for teachers in New York 
and Stern, et al., contrasted arbitration and factfinding in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. 
64. Delaney (1983). Delaney also presents some evidence that an 
arbitration statute has not reduced the dispersion of outcomes across bar-
gaining units in Iowa. 
65. In principle those "availability" studies that used bargaining 
unit data should be able to get "use" data through retrospective question-
naires. The Delaney (1983) study that used CPS data obviously could not 
do this. 
66. Only two studies have addressed this issue. Olson (1980) used 
a random effects model to try to handle the endogeneity of availability. 
Delaney (1983) reports some estimates of the effects of use of arbitration 
in the context of a model in which use is endogenous. However, he never 
specifies the variables that are included in his "use" equation so one can 
not evaluate what he has done. 
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67. Only recently have attempts been made to include a comparison 
of fringe benefits in the comparability surveys. For detail, see 
Hartman (1983). 
68. More specifically, the percentage differential is given by 
a . 
100(e -1). 
69. Whenever, authors used the latter approach, the estimates in 
Table A reflect their (or our) estimate of the average differential 
obtained from the two methods. 
70. We exclude the Wachter-Perloff study from our discussion of the 
level of government/private differentials or of trends in the differential 
over time since by using only low wage private sector service workers as 
the reference group, their public/private differentials become noncomparable 
to those of other studies. 
71. S. Smith (1977a), however, presents evidence that as of 1975 female 
postal workers received higher compensation than comparable females employed 
in other federal positions. See her Table 6.7. 
72. This is not to say, however, that there is no evidence of race of 
sex discrimination in the government sector. On this, see the next section 
of this paper. 
73. There are certain regions of the country and occupational cate-
gories, however, for which this result fails to hold. See S. Smith (1977a) 
Chapters IV and V. 
74. In earlier work, Borjas (1980a) (1980b) uses a similar model to 
explain why wages should vary across government agencies for individuals 
with comparable personal characteristics. 
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75. For a comparison of gross wage differentials that do not control 
for personal characteristics of workers, see U.S. Comptroller General 
(1982). 
76. These factors include education, age, marital status, family size, 
race, and sex. 
77. See Ronald Ehrenberg (1979a), Chapter 3, for a more detailed dis-
cussion of this point. Another interesting turnover study is Borjas (1982a) 
who focuses on why turnover rates vary across federal agencies. 
78. One should, however, not discount the possibility of different 
job titles and hence compensation for males and females who perform 
essentially the same work; for example, male prison guards and female 
prison matrons. This leads to the question of "comparable worth" which 
we will not discuss here. 
79. As noted in the previous section, one could alternatively estimate 
gender (race) differentials by calculating male (white) earnings from the 
female (nonwhite) equations and contrasting these estimates with the actual 
earnings levels. 
80. Black females were actually estimated to earn more than their 
white female colleagues in local government in 1975 (see Table 5), however, 
this differential was not statistically significant. 
81. See, for example, Freeman and Medoff (1982) and Ehrenberg and 
Schumann (1982), Chapter 7, for private sector studies of union effects 
on the demand for labor and the tradeoff between wages and an unfavorable 
job characteristic (mandatory overtime). 
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Table 1 
Estimated Union/Nonunion Earnings Differentials 
for Public School Teachers: Selected Studies 
Study Coverage Outcomes Union Variable 
Estimated 
Earnings 
Differential 
Baird & 
Landon 
(1972) 
Kasper 
(1970) 
Frey 
(1975) 
Llpsky & 
Drotnlng 
(1973) 
Hall & 
Carroll 
(1973) 
Thornton 
(1971) 
Balfour 
(1974) 
Chambers 
(1977) 
Moore 
(1976) 
Zueike & 
Frohrelch 
(1977) 
Gustman & 
Segal 
(1977) 
Holmes 
(1976) 
Gallagher 
(1978) 
Schmenner 
(1973) 
Baugh & 
Stone 
(1982) 
1966-67 
1967-68 
196A-65 to 
1969-75 
1967-68 
1968-69 
1969-70 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1970-71 
1970-71 
1972-73 
1972-73 
1974-75 
1976-77 
1962-70 
1) 1974 4 75 
2) 1977 & 78 
national (D) 
national (S) 
New Jersey (D) 
New York (D) 
Illinois (D) 
national (D) 
national (S) 
California (D) 
Nebraska (D) 
Wisconsin (D) 
national (D) 
Oklahoma (D) 
Illinois (D) 
9 large cities (D) 
national (C) 
starting salary (1,0) negotiations held 4.91 
average salary proportion of teachers or 0 
districts with union 
representation 
1) starting salary (1,0) formal contract 1) 0 to 1.4Z 
B.S. min., plus 
various steps in 
salary schedule 
average salary 
B.A. min. and max. 
K.A. min. and max. 
average salary 
1) starting salary 
2) increments 
average secondary/ 
average elementary 
salary 
variety of salary 
variables 
minimum salary, 
maximum salary, 
number of steps be-
tween min. and max. 
average salary 
(1,0) formal contract 0 to 3% 
(1,0) formal contract 1.8* 
(1,0) formal negotiations 0 to 51 save 
for M.A. max. 
which was >20X 
Z of teachers and/or dis- 0% 
trlcts covered by agreements 
(1,0) formal contract 
(1,0) formal negotiations 
1) 5.7 to 12.2% 
2) OZ 
negative 
index of comprehensiveness negative 
of negotiations 
(1,0) formal agreement 
(1,0) any union activity 
0 on min. or 
max., but 
reduce number 
of steps 
7Z 
variety of measures (1,0) presence of collective 1 to 4.52 
bargaining 
B.A. min. salary 
annual earnings 
Z union members 
(1,0) formal agreement 
(1,0) union member 
(1,0) union or employee 
association member 
12 to 14% 
6 to 9Z 
0 to 7Z 
12 to 22Z 
where D - school district level data 
S - state level data 
C - individual data from the CFS 
Table 
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Study 
Estimated Union/Nonunion Earning Differentials 
Noneducatlonui limpLoyees: Selected Studies 
Year Coverage Outcomes Union Variable 
Estimated 
Earnings 
Differential 
Ashenfelter 
(1971) 
Freund 
(1974) 
Fottler 
(1977) 
Ehrenberg & 
Goldstein 
(1975) 
Schmenner 
(1973) 
Ehrenberg 
(1973c) 
1960-66 
1965 to 
1971 
1966, 1969, 
1972 
1967 
1962 to 
1970 
1969 
firefighters 
noneducatlonal 
employees 
hospital employees 
10 categories non-
educational 
employees 
police and fire-
fighters in 9 large 
cities 
firefighters 
1) average hourly (1,0) any union members 
wage 
2) annual hours 
3) annual salary 
% change in average % union members 
weekly earnings 
average weekly Z union members 
average monthly Z represented by a union 
earnings 
minimum salary Z union members 
(1,0) formal bargaining 
hourly and annual (1,0) some union members 
minimum, maximum and (1,0) formal contract 
average salary 
1) 2 to 10% 
2) -3 to -9% 
3) 0 
4 to 8% 
2 to 16% 
15Z 
0 
2 to 18Z pri-
marily due to 
lower hours 
Shapiro 
(1978) 
Cain, et al. 
(1981) 
Ehrenberg 
(1980) 
Bartcl & 
Lewin 
(1981) 
Edwards & 
Edwards 
(1982a)(1982b) 
Victor 
(1979) 
Hall i 
Vanderporten 
(1977) 
1971 
1973-76 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1973 
noneduca t iona1 
(individual data) 
hospital employees 
hourly pay 
hourly pay 
(1,0) union member 0 to 20Z 
1) individual data 
2) by hospital 
3) by SMSA 
police 
firefighters 
police 
sanitation 
1) police 
2) fire 
3) sanitation 
police 
hourly compensation 
minimum, maximum 
annual & hourly 
salary 
minimum, maximum 
average annual 
salaries and hourly 
wage 
average hourly wage 
average hourly 
earnings 
minimum, maximum 
average annual 
1) (1,0) union membership 
2) (1,0) organized 
3) Z organized 
(1,0) formal 
negotiations 
(1,0) written contract 
(1,0) any union members 
Z organized 
(1,0) any union members 
(1,0) written contract 
(1,0) written contract 
(1,0) formal negotiations 
0 
2) 
3) 
on wages -
0 to 10%, on 
fringes some-
what larger 
3 to 10Z 
6Z 
10-21Za 
10-17Z 
10-llZ 
7-12% 
9-13Z 
7-14Z 
0 
< 10Z 
Becker 
(1979) 
Ichniowski 
(1980) 
Feldman & 
Scheffler 
(1982) 
Ehrenberg, 
Sherman & 
Schwarz 
(1983) 
Moore & 
Raislan 
(1981) 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1977 
hospital employees 
firefighters 
hospital employees 
libraries 
average wage (1,0) occupation covered 
by a contract 
(1,0) occupation is non-
union job In hospital with 
some contracts 
min., max., average (1,0) presence of contract 
hourly & annual wages 
& contributions to 
fringes 
average salary (1,0) presence of written 
average fringe costs agreement 
minimum, maximum 
annual salaries 
(1,0) any collective 
bargaining agreement 
1967 to 
1977 
noneducatlonal 
(individual data 
from CPS) 
hourly wages (1,0) union member 
7Z 
8Z 
0-3%% (wages) 
18% (fringes) 
salary 8-12% 
fringes 
0 to 18% 
higher in 
later years 
Obtained from two-stage least squares framework. 
Ill 
Table 3 
Estimates of Wage Elasticities of Demand for 
Labor in the State and Local Sector 
Category (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Education 
Noneducation 
Streets and Highways 
Public Welfare 
Hospitals 
Public Health 
Police 
Fire 
Sanitation and Sewage 
Natural Resources 
General Control and 
Financial Administration 
All Categories 
-1.06 -0.08 to -0.57 -0.57 to -0.82 -0.89 
-0.38 
-0.09 -0.44 to -0.64 
-0.32 -0.33 to -1.13 
-0.30 -0.30 to -0.51 
-0.12 -0.26 to -0.32 
-0.29 -0.01 to -0.35 
-0.53 -0.23 to -0.31 
-0.23 -0.40 to -0.56 
-0.39 -0.39 to -0.60 
-0.28 -0.09 to -0.34 
-0.53 
Sources: 
(1) Orley Ashenfelter and Ronald Ehrenberg, "The Demand for Labor in the Public 
Sector" in Labor in the Public and Nonprofit Sectors, ed. Daniel Hamermesh 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), Table 6. 
(2) Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "The Demand for State and Local Government Employees," 
American Economic Review 63 (June 1973): 366-79. 
(3) Robert J. Thornton, "The Elasticity of Demand for Public School Teachers," 
Industrial Relations 18 (Winter 1979): 86-91. 
(4) Hui S. Chang and Yu Hsing, "A Note on the Demand for Faculty in Public Higher 
Education," Industrial Relations (Spring 1982): 256-60. 
(5) Orley Ashenfelter, "Demand and Supply Functions for State and Local Government 
Employment," in Ashenfelter and Wallace Oates, eds., Essays in Labor Market 
Analysis (New York: Halstead Press, 1979). 
Table 4 
Estimates of Public/Private Percentage Earnings Differentials: 
by Level of Government, Race, Sex, and Year 
Federal State Local 
Y e a r / S t u d y A M F WM WF NM NF P WP A M F W M A M F W M 
1960 
1970 
1973 
1975 
1978 
S. Smith (1976abc) (1977ab) 
Quinn3 (1979a) (1979b) 
S. Smith (1976abc) (1977ab) 
(1983) 
S. Smith (1977a) (1982) 
S. Smith (1977a) (1982) (1983) 
Bellante and Long (1981) 
S. Smith (1981) (1983) 
Wachter & Perloff (1981) 
21 
20 
34 
20 
15 
18 
11 
38 
21 
24 
21 
8 
22 
4 
19 
8 
15 
15 
27 
15 
33 
20 
2 
16 
-3 
-7 
-3 
2 
14 
6 
8 
11 
12 
-5 
7 
-7 
-7 
-4 
-4 
-3 
6 
1 
-2 
-2 
A - all employees in group 
M - male WM - white male NM - nonwhite male P - postal workers 
F - female WF - white female NF - nonwhite female WP - white male postal workers 
Quinn studies focus on white males 45+. 
Wachter and Perloff study uses private sector service workers as reference group. As a result, their 
public/private earnings differential estimates are artificially high. 
i — • 
i — • 
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Table 5 
A) Estimates of the Percentage by Which Male Employees' Earnings Exceed 
Those of Female Employees with Equivalent Personal Characteristics 
Sector/Year 
Federal 
State 
Local 
Private 
1973 
23 
22 
19 
36 
1975 
34 
19 
16 
28 
B) Estimates of the Percentage by Which Black Employees' Wages Are Less 
Than Those of White Employees with Equivalent Personal Characteristics 
in 1975 
Sector/Gender Male Female 
Federal 13 5 
State 5 2 
Local 8 -2 
Private 11 4 
Source: Authors' interpretation of results presented in S. Smith (1977a), 
Chapter 6. In cases where separate earnings equations were 
estimated by gender (or race) the male (white) equation was 
used by us to calculate the earnings differentials. 
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